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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century, scores of cities across the United States were forced to
combat the effects of both the physical deterioration of their urban landscapes and a
corresponding economic decline. Longstanding neighborhoods, overcrowded with inhabitants,
were developing into slums, while simultaneously, increasingly antiquated industries were
departing to the more profitable suburbs, with residents following suit. In the face of these
threatening trends there arose the presumptive need for complete revitalization. Under the guise
of a pursuit towards modernization, social progress, and economic viability, this was viewed by
some political leaders as both an opportunity and a means to reconstruct and reform their cities
according to their desires. Instead, it merely served to put forth programs which allowed for the
removal and relocation of the poorest urban populations situated within rundown and
undeveloped ‘slum’ neighborhoods.
Beginning in the 1950’s, many areas of poverty and blight, the physical evidence of
urban decay, would be removed in the hopes that economic, social, and moral prosperity would
appear in its place.1 Implemented by city governments and backed by the federal government
itself, this would be known as ‘urban renewal’ or ‘redevelopment,’ and would include the
extensive (and expensive) acquisition and demolition of property, the sale of the cleared land for
development, and the building of new infrastructure. Based upon the potential positive outcomes
of urban renewal, the general supposition of the time was that its effects would be beneficial to
these struggling cities. This though was not always the case. In actuality, redevelopment caused
the compulsory displacement of residents, and thus the destruction of cohesive and longstanding
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Allan R. Talbot, The Mayor’s Game: Richard Lee of New Haven and the Politics of Change (New York: Harper &
Row, 1967), 16-17.
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neighborhoods, leaving in its wake the wholesale radical transformation of urban environments –
especially that of the City of New Haven.
Once a small, relatively insignificant northeastern colony, around the late nineteenth
century New Haven had blossomed into a notedly beautiful, prosperous, and ever-growing urban
industrial center. This though would not last. Due to a combination of the massive influx of
immigration, the presence of acutely antiquated and deplorable living conditions, and economic
deterioration stemming from an obsolete manufacturing and regressing commercial base, by the
end of the Second World War, New Haven had begun to plummet. In an attempt to avoid this
ominous fate, drastic change, namely revitalization and renewal, was viewed as an immediate
necessity. As a result, the city fully embraced the urban renewal movement with swarms of
bulldozers and wrecking balls.
Originating in the mid-1950’s under Mayor Richard C. Lee, New Haven undertook an
unprecedented, large-scale plan of redevelopment in order to not only halt this decline and revive
its ‘dying city,’ but also to place the city at the forefront of modern urban planning. To achieve
this, Lee made urban renewal his primary ambition – his ‘master trope.’ With the benefit of the
absence of threatening opposition, he was able to utilize his political power to galvanize support,
navigate/control the focus of public opinion, and exploit newly accessible federal funds. Lee’s
goal though, to establish New Haven as a ‘model city,’ the new standard for progress and urban
restoration, would be short-lived.2 Issues with financing and private development, the
overestimation of the ability to effectuate widespread change (both physical and socioeconomic),
the excessive intricacy of the plans (the massive relocation of residents and the need for secured
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Douglas W. Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 302-305.
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private development), and the lack of foresight concerning the dramatic nature of urban renewal
itself, brought about failure.
Lee, and others within the umbrella of New Haven redevelopment, were unable to grasp
the sheer vastness, complexity, and actual comprehensive scope of the renewal program that they
had chosen to undertake. Simply put, they lacked adequate awareness as to the magnitude of the
effect that the utter obliteration of neighborhoods would have upon the city’s population and
economy, as well as the physical landscape itself. Rather than a solution to its plaguing issues or
generating a positive transformation, the City of New Haven’s implementation of destructive,
demolition-oriented renewal only served to deepen its urban crisis and exacerbate its decline by
dividing the city, destroying communities, and accelerating the effects of suburbanization. In a
broad sense, New Haven did become a ‘model city,’ but not the one that Lee had hoped. Today,
New Haven stands as a perfect case study to display the failures and undoing of mid-twentieth
century redevelopment, specifically in the form of ‘slum clearance’ and highway construction,
that was not only unsuccessful in solving the various issues which troubled cities, but also helped
to further their decline.
The ineffectiveness of New Haven’s urban renewal is embodied by the first and most
unsuccessful portion of the city’s redevelopment endeavor: the Oak Street Project. The Oak
Street neighborhood, located southwest of the city center, had long been home to an ethnically
diverse, lower income, immigrant population. Its physical environment and living conditions
were below substandard, even repulsive in some parts – remnants from an outdated era that,
according to many, prevented the city from progressing forward. Declaring this to be New
Haven’s worst slum, Mayor Lee would instigate its total destruction in favor of massive new
construction and ‘modern’ architecture, including the creation of an extensive thoroughfare
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known as the ‘Oak Street Connector.’ Linking together two major inter-state highways with a
state road from the surrounding suburban towns, the Connector was designed to draw both traffic
and people into the heart of the city. However, such a vast urban renewal project necessitated the
immense relocation of thousands of residents and hundreds of businesses – what amounted to the
displacement and annihilation of an entire community and its subsequent transformation into a
‘wasteland’ – heaps of empty grass lots, off-street parking, and a half-completed, obtuse, and
unused highway spur. This would endure as a tragic, much abhorred, self-inflicted wound, whose
effects remain as a stain on the legacy of the Lee and the City of New Haven. Furthermore, it
represents the inherent flaws of the destructive, demolition-based urban (human) renewal that
had been employed by many cities during the 1950’s/60’s as a means for tackling deterioration
and serves as an anachronism against the social progression, technological innovation, and
overall modernization of the twentieth century.
This will seek to explore the foundational underpinnings of New Haven’s urban renewal
program, with an examination of Mayor Richard C. Lee and the Oak Street Project, in order to
uncover an answer as to how such an endeavor originated and why it not only failed, but also
greatly harmed the city. Chapter 1 will examine the background of New Haven, its rise as an
industrial center, expansion through immigration, and well-documented nineteenth century
beauty and prosperity, in order to provide an understanding of the city’s physical condition and
social environment just prior to Lee’s election. It will also incorporate the swift establishment of
New Haven’s neighborhoods, particularly the Oak Street area (including its adjacent Legion
Avenue) and the initial calls for redevelopment and urban planning. Chapter 2 will detail the
origins of the Oak Street Project with specific insight into Lee’s central role in leading New
Haven’s urban redevelopment campaign. Simply put, how was Lee able to put together such a
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monumental project? Focus will be placed upon the newly created federal resources and Lee’s
ability to exploit them, along with his circumnavigation of any political/popular opposition. In
particular, this includes his Redevelopment Agency and the Citizens Action Commission,
elements that essentially constructed a public consensus in alignment with the city’s bureaucratic
aspirations. The function of Yale and other interest groups, as well as the civic
attitudes/sentiments concerning the project will also be analyzed. Chapter 3 will address the
objectives and implementation of the Oak Street Project itself, with specific attention to its
outcomes and consequences. Included is a discussion of the widespread demolition, relocation,
and suburbanization, and the role that they played in the decline of the city to its present status as
a relatively insignificant, poverty-stricken urban center. Additionally, it will be asked whether
race and the rapidly changing demographics factored into the desire for urban renewal and the
surprising willingness of residents to relocate (i.e., ‘white flight’). Given this, could the city have
pursued an alternative path to achieve revitalization and does Lee bear responsibility for the
overestimation and lack of foresight in promoting such a radical plan and its subsequent failure?
Lastly, Chapter 4 will evaluate the legacy of the Oak Street Project and explore other urban
renewal efforts, both within New Haven and throughout the nation, seeking to explain why such
a destructive version of redevelopment, as implemented by many cities, politicians, and urban
planners, was so popular and highly regarded. The prominent historiography of the
redevelopment movement of the 1950’s/60’s should provide crucial answers to this question,
and, in light of the Oak Street project, create an understanding of how it should be viewed as a
method of confronting urban decay.
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CHAPTER I: THE ELM CITY
“If you were to set a poet to make a town, with carte blanche as to trees, gardens, and green
blinds, he would probably turn out very much such a place as New Haven.” 3

(Original plan for New Haven)

One of the initial sites of English settlement in Connecticut, the New Haven Colony dates
back to 1638, when five hundred settlers under the leadership of Puritan minister John Davenport
sailed into the harbor, landing in what would become downtown New Haven.4 Arguably the first
planned American city, New Haven was unique among the Anglo-American colonies, with the
design of the city centered upon nine squares of land situated around an open center space, later
known as the ‘Green.’ According to author Erik Vogt, New Haven’s intensely religious founders
perceived this organized geometry as “sacred,” with its symmetrical grid plan “derived from a
divinely ordained pattern of settlement.”5 It was a ‘perfect’ city, established as an imitation of the
Garden of Eden or the prophet Ezekiel’s ‘New Jerusalem’ – a new haven.6 Celebrated as the
William Emery Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms” (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse, & Taylor, 1885), 85.
Preston Maynard and Marjorie B. Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks: The Rise and Fall of an
Industrial City (New Haven, Connecticut. University of New England Press, 2004), 2.
5
Erik Vogt, Yale in New Haven: Architecture and Urbanism – A New Haven & A New Earth: The Origin and
Meaning of the Nine-Square Plan (New Haven: Yale University, 2004), 13.
6
Vogt, Yale in New Haven, 38.
3
4
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“most opulent colony which came into New England,” New Haven merged with the Connecticut
Colony in the early 1660’s to form a single governmental unit under the Royal Charter. 7
The city’s most important transformative moment would come in 1716, with the
relocation from Saybrook, Connecticut of the colony’s only institution of higher learning, which
would later be named after British philanthropist Elihu Yale. 8 Yale College eventually became
the single most important corporate entity in New Haven, providing immeasurable economic
impact, creating jobs, and drawing in business, money, spending, and flocks of the wealthy elite.9
Since that time, New Haven’s success and prominence has been directly intertwined with the
fortunes of Yale itself. 10 This symbiotic relationship also played a major role in the social
progress of the region, intellectually and scientifically, and aided in propelling New Haven, as
well as the entire United States, towards industrial and technological advancement, with Yale
educating some of the nation’s most significant innovators and instrumental historical figures.11
By the early nineteenth century, the growth of Yale had become “steady and rapid…both in
number of students and wealth,” spreading advancement and success to New Haven itself. 12
Officially incorporated as a city in 1784, New Haven proceeded to enter “upon a career
of remarkable prosperity.”13 In 1885, W. E. Decrow wrote, “Very few are the cities, anywhere,
that have grown so steadily and continued to rapidly increase in wealth and population.”14
Decrow noted Yale’s influence and contribution to New Haven, “Crippled by poverty for the
first 130 years of its existence, [Yale] pressed bravely forward, ever increasing in excellence of

Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 81-82.
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 3.
9
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 3.
10
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 3.
11
Richard Shelton Kirby, ed, Inventors and Engineers of Old New Haven (New Haven: New Haven Colony
Historical Society, 1939).
12
Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 4.
13
Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 83.
14
Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 83.
7
8
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education and in number of students, and never failing for a moment to retain its position in the
very first rank of American colleges.”15 According to S. H. Elliot, Yale is to New Haven, as “the
Vatican is to Rome, or St. Paul’s to London.” 16
With the establishment Yale as a vital part of the city, New Haven began to expand
outward in size, as the population in 1800 more than doubled in just twenty years to 8,327
inhabitants.17 At the time, New Haven still remained a town of fenced gardens and uncrowded
squares, but, like other developing urban cities, its rising industries were handicapped by a lack
of available labor. Samuel Koenig acknowledged that in the 1840’s, New Haven was “so badly
in need of workers” that long black wagons, called ‘slavers,’ were sent to the outlying farming
communities in search of laborers.18 This would drastically change by the mid-nineteenth
century, as New Haven experienced the early stages of mass overseas immigration that saw the
arrival of tens of thousands into the city, thus satisfying its need for a supply of cheap labor.19
The effect was self-perpetuating, as the demand for labor served to create a corresponding
increase the influx of foreign immigrants into New Haven, as many flocked to the city seeking
work in its multitude of manufacturing enterprises.20 As a result, the city’s economy radically
shifted from colonial maritime/mercantile pursuits to a modernized and increasingly mechanized
industrial/commercial base.21

Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 3.
Samuel Hayes Elliot, The Attractions of New Haven, Connecticut (New York: N. Tibbals & Co., 1869), 72.
17
Sarah Day Woodward, Early New Haven (New Haven: The Price, Lee & Adkins co. 1912),118; Rae, Maynard
and Noyes eds., Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 5.
18
Samuel Koenig, Immigrant Settlements in Connecticut: Their Growth and Characteristics Federal Writers’
Project (Hartford: Connecticut State Department of Education, 1938), 15.
19
Rae, City, 35.
20
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 1.
21
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 5-6.
15
16

12
While New Haven did not claim a singular major industry as its ‘identity,’ carriage
construction soon became as a substantial pillar of the city’s commerce.22 The success of
carriage manufacturing allowed for both more employment opportunities and easier travel,
thereby effectively increasing New Haven’s total commerce. This though, was only possible
because of the city’s location, namely its harbor and position as a coastal trading center, which
enabled the export of products throughout the nation, as well as the Caribbean and South
America.23 By 1860, the Elm City would boast over forty carriage manufacturers, whose
economic output, as seen through their ‘invested capital,’ ‘annual value,’ and ‘number of
employees,’ vastly trumped that of other Connecticut manufacturing giants Bridgeport and
Hartford, such that in 1869, S. H. Elliot even claimed that New Haven had “the largest carriage
establishment in America.”24 Moreover, Everett Gleason Hill, noting that “labor was abundant
and easily obtained,” declared that New Haven was “the greatest manufacturing city of a great
manufacturing state.”25 What set New Haven apart from the nation’s other industrial cities was
not its dominance in making one particular product, but rather its overall diversity and versatility
of manufacturing.26 One observer wrote that “The distinguishing characteristic of New Haven
business interests is their manifold variety. There is hardly a commodity of extensive use, from a
needle to an engine, that is not manufactured in this city.” 27 Similarly, Decrow noted that
firearms, clocks, locks, fishlines, corsets, and many other “knick-knacks” were annually

22

Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 1.
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 5-6.
24
Carolyn C. Cooper, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks – Building an Industrial
District: Carriage Manufacture in New Haven, 47-49; Elliot, The Attractions of New Haven, 67.
25
Everett G. Hill, A Modern History of New Haven and Eastern New Haven County Vol. 1. (New York - Chicago:
The S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1918), 174-177.
26
Cooper, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 45-66.
27
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 1.
23
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manufactured in New Haven “by [the] millions.” 28 Simply put, New Haven had become a “beehive of industry.”29
This industrial explosion was further facilitated by the introduction of the railroad. While
the harbor had been an important initial source of New Haven’s commerce, it was the railroad
that ensured access to materials, as well as markets and the influx of visitors, consumers, and
new inhabitants.30 Providing direct routes to New York and Boston, the railroad was crucial in
connecting New Haven to the rest of the state and the nation. Author Douglas W. Rae argues that
this feature of “low-cost, high-reliability fixed-path transport,” which allowed the movement of
high volume of materials, goods, and people to a small number of predetermined destinations,
was fundamental in what he considered as New Haven’s period of “centering development” and
its elevation to a hub of industry and progress.31
The relationship between shipping availability and the railroad produced “the flowering
of intensive manufacturing,” and thus, social and commercial growth.32 The noteworthy expanse
of New Haven’s industry created “explosions of economic energy” that swelled the city’s
population.33 New Haven’s ‘grand list’ (an estimated measure of taxable property inside city
limits) expanded from scarcely $10 million in 1850, to nearly $47 million in 1880, which,
according to Decrow, was the peak of New Haven’s prosperity and prominence – the city was
riding a wave of success and progression that many other New England cities were similarly
experiencing.34 This distinction as a leading industrial and economic center, along with its

Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 83.
Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 83.
30
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 13.
31
Douglas W. Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks – Technology, Population
Growth, and Centered Industrialism: New Haven, 1850-2000, 79.
32
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 80.
33
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 81.
34
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 81; Decrow, Yale and “The City of
Elms”, 84.
28
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“intellectual growth [and] continued social advance,” acted as components which rendered New
Haven a community of eminently intelligent, highly cultivated residents. 35
Even New Haven’s physical appearance was noteworthy. Decrow wrote:
It is unquestionably one of the most beautiful cities in the world, and one which the
stranger always remembers with pleasure. Nowhere else can be found the wealth of
broad-spreading, shadow-casting elms possessed by New Haven… Street after street,
avenue after avenue, is arched with these noble trees. As to beauty and variety of
architecture displayed in the dwellings, nothing, anywhere, excels it. 36
It was ostensibly this attractiveness, both economic and physical, along with the
introduction of extensive transportation, which lured the masses. To Elliot, New Haven was a
“very handsome city… a town now of goodly proportions, and is much frequented by strangers
and travelers in search of pleasure.”37 Up until this point though, New Haven was not a true
“boom town,” as it developed and grew rather slowly and steadily, as opposed to
spasmodically.38 But with the emergence of Yale as one of, if not the, premier national institution
for higher education, in combination with the city’s ever-expanding manufacturing base and the
introduction of the railroad, New Haven saw a rapid expansion, drawing in thousands of new
residents and completely altering the city’s socioeconomic and physical environment.
Astoundingly, by 1880 New Haven had expanded to over 60,000 residents, about a
quarter of which had been born outside the United States. 39 The impact caused by the arrival of
such a massive volume of immigrants entirely changed not only the city’s general demographics,
but also its social complexion and identity. Different cultures, religions, and values were
introduced, leading to a true melting-pot of diverse, ethnically based churches/synagogues, clubs,

Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 84.
Decrow, Yale and “The City of Elms”, 84.
37
Elliot, The Attractions of New Haven, Connecticut, 13.
38
Hill, A Modern History of New Haven and Eastern New Haven County, 61.
39
Maynard and Noyes, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 13.
35
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and importantly, new neighborhoods. The effect was described by author Stephen Lassonde, who
writes, “the composition of New Haven’s neighborhoods changed almost continuously and
kaleidoscopically.” 40 To adjust to this influx of residents, an expansion of the physical space
occurred – new streets were laid out, former upper-middle class one-family homes were
partitioned, and cheap housing, such as tenements and multi-family housing began to spring up,
particularly in parts of the city where industry attracted labor. 41 According to Lassonde,
immigrants disembarking trains from New York to New Haven could walk a mile and a half in
any direction and find themselves surrounded by speakers of a multitude of European
languages.42 Eventually, clusters of individual communities arose, as “each group in its turn
sought to reconstruct the web of relations that had furnished whatever measure of security and
comfort they had relied upon in the ancient towns from which they had emigrated.” 43 As Koenig
wrote, “An outstanding characteristic of practically all immigrants is the tendency to live in
compact colonies or settlements.”44 While some ethnicities claimed their own small sections of
the city, many neighborhoods were home to different, yet interconnected groups of people.
These immigrant communities would experience a remarkable surge in population
density – a dynamic that was shaped after 1870 by improvements to trans-Atlantic travel (the
implementation of large-scale steamships), which reduced travel time from as much as six
weeks, to as little as just seven days by 1890. 45 Through an analysis of passenger fare
advertisements, it is evident that cost correspondingly decreased, as the average annual first class

Stephen Lassonde, Learning to Forget: Schooling and Family Life in New Haven’s Working Class, 1870-1940
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 13.
41
Lassonde, Learning to Forget, 14.
42
Lassonde, Learning to Forget, 15.
43
Lassonde, Learning to Forget, 15.
44
Koenig, Immigrant Settlements in Connecticut, 25.
45
Lassonde, Learning to Forget, 16.
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nominal ticket price fell from almost $160 in 1826, to around $60 at the turn of the century.46
While only a select few travelers would have purchased a first class ticket, this drop in price can
serve as a baseline for the cost of all trans-Atlantic travel. The effect was a significant increase in
the volume of migration from Europe to the United States, as it enhanced the convenience and
accessibility of such travel and drastically diminished the danger of disease, which was often
pervasive on the previously lengthy voyages.47
From 1880 to 1920, arguably the most prolific era of European immigration to the United
States, New Haven was transformed from a typical New England coastal community into an
overpopulated urban center, thriving with commerce and industry. In the span of a mere fourdecades, New Haven expanded to over 162,000 inhabitants – a net gain (taking into account
deaths and departures) of 100,000 new residents (roughly sixty percent of the total population
growth in its entire existence) – and saw a swelling of its ‘grand list’ to more than $242
million.48 While at the time, this explosion may have been viewed as only the first step in the
city’s rise into prominence as an urban industrial and economic mecca, in reality, it would be its
peak. Although the mass arrival of immigrants did generate an immense growth and expansion
of the city’s industry, it also functioned as a symbolic double-edged sword, as it brought about
overcrowding, urban sprawl, and the physical deterioration of living conditions. Further, like
other cities during this period, many of New Haven’s upper-class residents departed these
conditions for the more attractive suburbs, leaving behind predominately less affluent, workingclass immigrants in their stead.

Brandon Dupont, Drew Keeling, and Thomas Weiss, “Passenger Fares for Overseas Travel in the 19th and 20th
Centuries” Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, Vancouver, August 15, 2012.
47
Lassonde, Learning to Forget, 16.
48
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 81.
46
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Since the mid-nineteenth century, New Haven’s primary area of settlement for immigrant
groups was the “Hill” district, situated southwest of the original ‘nine squares’ and extending
from Oak Street and Legion Avenue to the West River.49 The Irish, whose settler beginnings date
back to the Colonial period, were the first ethnic group to immigrate to New Haven en masse and
continued to outnumber the remainder of the city’s immigrant population up until the early
twentieth century.50 Koenig reported that in 1860, almost three-fourths of the foreign-born
population in Connecticut were of Irish descent. 51 But this would drastically change due to the
arrival of large numbers of Italians (described by Koenig as “little short of phenomenal”), which
culminated in one of the highest fractions of Italian immigrants per capita in the entire nation,
with over 41,000 individuals – one quarter of the city’s entire population. 52 According to the US
Census, the Italian foreign-born population of Connecticut in 1860 was a mere 61 individuals,
but by 1930, just a half century later, it would skyrocket to around 90,000.53 Initially, these new
Italian immigrants settled into the Oak Street area, but attracted by the opportunities provided by
the breadth of carriage manufacturing companies and cheap accommodations, many of them
gradually began an egress to Wooster Square, east of the New Haven Green, forming a culturally
unique nucleus later known as ‘Little Italy.’54
With the departure of much of the Italian community to the Wooster area, Oak Street
transitioned into the primary home for the new influx of Jewish immigrants, many of whom
arrived due to mounting economic distress (to which the United States offered a breadth of
opportunity) or increased persecution in Europe (particularly Russia, Poland, and Lithuania) and

49
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the escalation of ruthless pogroms, the denial of civil rights, and amplified social
discrimination/restrictions. Although they were a numerically significant portion of New
Haven’s population, it is difficult to determine their exact number, since Jews were not classified
separately in the Census. Nonetheless, similar to the experience of the Italians before them, the
Jewish population also increased exponentially, ultimately comprising a large percentage of the
city’s residents. According to Koenig, in the 1930’s, the City of New Haven boasted the third
highest proportionally large Jewish population in the entire nation, at approximately 27,000. 55
They would fashion Oak Street, and particularly its offshoot Legion Avenue (established
in 1927 in honor of New Haven citizens who had served in World War One), into an
Americanized version of a shtetl, a traditional Eastern European Jewish village, dominated by a
vast assortment of shops and stores, grocers, pharmacies, delicatessens, bakeries, synagogues,
and packed tenements, which were usually two or three family dwellings.56 The people of this
neighborhood, as Sherman Kramer stated, “worked together, shopped together, [and] lived
together… People lived as friends and neighbors in harmony” – life in the area was friendly and
interconnected, though regularly punctuated by squabbles.57 It was a place where everyone knew
everyone.58 Although many families had gradually assimilated into American society, there was
still a separate identity, as Yiddish remained the dominant language throughout the community. 59
Countless stories recalled with vivid nostalgia by its former residents illustrate the
“indelible impressions” that were cemented by the “vibrant and exciting” neighborhood – a
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clannish community which possessed a very unique aura and distinctive atmosphere. 60 In a
perhaps overly nostalgic tone, Abraham Silverman asserted that the area’s Jewish population
“filled their days and nights with toil, sacrifice, drive, a rich sense of piety and with dreams for
themselves and their loved ones as they dug their roots deeper, or first planted them, into the
fertile soil of free and blessed America.” 61 While the living conditions were certainly below
modern standards, Silverman believed that despite the “appearance of drabness,” there was “no
questioning the vitality, energy, and activity” of the Oak Street district and its people. 62 It was
within this new neighborhood, particularly Legion Avenue, that the Jewish community continued
to thrive and expand, particularly on the heels of the Holocaust and the influx of relocated
survivors, who would set up shop and immerse themselves in the Elm City. 63
The swift rise of New Haven’s population also directly coincided with economic decline.
By the mid-1950’s, many of the city’s numerous factories, which formed the foundation of its
manufacturing sector, had been rendered obsolete due to shifts in industry, the effects of the
Great Depression, and the growth of “increasingly muscular and invasive” national
corporations.64 Many local firms were left “gaunt and deserted,” or had moved to the suburbs.65
Downtown retail was stagnating, and middle-class residents, simply all those who could afford it,
were already decamping for the surrounding, flourishing suburban towns.66 With this came
extreme overcrowding and an expansion of poverty, which in turn, led to the deterioration of
conditions in these working-class areas and the rise of slums and urban blight.
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Despite the fluctuating makeup of these immigrant neighborhoods, New Haven’s Oak
Street enclave continued to be the city’s most densely populated and industrialized section,
comprising some of its poorest residents. It remained a “symbolically ghettoized” block, with the
effects of the Great Depression only serving to exacerbate this situation. 67 Fred Ticotsky, son of
the owners of the renowned ‘Ticotsky’s Bakery’ on Legion Avenue, recalled the difficulty of
many to “have food on the table,” with the half-price ‘day-old’ bread from the bakery becoming
a popular delicacy.68 Further, many of these communities were without electricity, gas, or
plumbing, living “cheek by jowl in long rows of dark, timeworn tenements and cold-water flats
with junk-strewn back lots.”69
In the face of such notable deterioration and “an accretion of man-made features that
reflected historical rather than current hopes and needs,” there arose appeals for ‘urban renewal,’
as expounded by the proposals of prominent landscape architects Cass Gilbert and Frederick
Law Olmstead.70Appointed by the mayor of New Haven in 1907, Gilbert and Olmstead wrote in
their Report of the New Haven Civic Improvement Commission (1910), that “The citizens of New
Haven are familiar with the fact that the city is growing… and that it is changing character as it
grows; but many of them fail to realize how rapid and how profound these changes are likely to
be in the near future.”71 In this, they presented a comprehensive, wide-sweeping proposal for the
revitalization of New Haven, putting forth a myriad of changes/alterations to almost all of its
features in order to “preserve and perpetuate the beauty of the city and suggest lines of further
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development for its future growth.”72 This would also include the recommendation for the total
clearance of the Oak Street neighborhood. 73
In both scope and approach, Gilbert and Olmstead’s ‘1910 Plan’ served as a conduit, an
“exemplary synthesis,” for the ‘City Beautiful Movement’ – a progressive social reform
philosophy developed in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century to institute moral and civic
virtues upon poorer, slum-like areas through modern, aesthetically pleasing architecture and
blanket urban planning.74 In their vision, the institution of parks and open spaces were vital to the
modern urban landscape, not merely an “aesthetic embellishment of a well-planned city, but
necessary to the health and social development of city dwellers.” 75 A radical solution to the city’s
traffic congestion was also proposed – a giant submerged avenue, a “subway,” stretching from
the railroad station to the Green. 76

(New Haven City Entrance Plan design by Gilbert and Olmstead in 1910)

Most importantly though, the 1910 Plan displayed the idealism of a growing need for
collective responsibility, with urban order and “contemporary” strategies predicated upon bold
forecasts of population growth and diversification. 77 In fact, Gilbert and Olmstead projected that
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New Haven would expand to “some 400,000 [residents] by the year 1950” and to “about a
million and a half” by the end of the twentieth century,” barring any “radical and unexpected
changes in economic and social conditions.” 78 Both claims proved to be wild overestimations.
Overall, the City Beautiful Movement was criticized by many, including author Jane
Jacobs, who, in 1961, affirmed that “Great schemes were drawn up for systems of baroque
boulevards, which mainly came to nothing.” 79 While their blueprint had little impact on enacting
any actual physical change in New Haven, it did spark ideas concerning urban renewal, including
the creation of a city plan commission.80 Although City Beautiful planning and architecture
“went out of style,” its underlying philosophies and designs continued to propagate, fueled by the
advent and subsequent proliferation of federal social programs and public works projects that
had originally begun with Roosevelt’s New Deal and expanded extensively after the Second
World War.81
In 1941 the city would hire Maurice Rotival, a well-known city planner, as a private
consultant to satisfy the growing calls for renewal. Rotival similarly presented his own
‘comprehensive scheme of development,’ which emphasized the increasing importance of the
automobile and recommended the utilization of New Haven’s remarkably large harbor as a
“front door,” funneling movement into the city. 82 This too achieved little change. He theorized
that New Haven, due to its location, was a ‘traffic distribution center,’ and that any plan for
redesign would have to introduce an entirely new system of interstate roadways, stating that,
“Fresh, healthy arteries encourage all kind of tissue to grow around them.” 83 In all, Rotival’s
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bold blueprint would require approximately twenty-five percent of the city’s land area to be
redeveloped, and, like Gilbert and Olmstead, the wholesale demolition of Oak Street.84
In his study of political power and community representation in New Haven, Who
Governs?, Robert A. Dahl concluded that there were three factors which had inhibited the impact
of these initial proposals for renewal: 1) they were expensive and simply unaffordable for the
city; 2) they did not provide a realistic political process that would allow for the city to secure an
agreement for a strategic plan; and 3) politicians, whose support was necessary, were wary of the
possible public pushback that could result from sponsoring such a significant movement. 85
Chiefly, who would tear down the old buildings, pave the new roads, and pay the costs? 86 By the
mid-century mark, these questions would be answered, as the issues that Dahl noted, those that
had deterred the civic improvement ideas of Gilbert, Olmstead, and Rotival, would no longer be
obstacles. Rather, the changing atmosphere would actually enable, and even encourage, the
implementation of redevelopment programs in cities like New Haven. The aestheticization and
exhaustive nature of what should be dubbed the city’s ‘early-modern’ urban planning efforts,
along with the injection of substantial post-Depression federal funding and subsidies, functioned
as the ideological origin, the genesis, of the physical environment reformation that incased the
1950’s. This culminated in an ad hoc ‘urban renewal’ movement that allowed planners to use
cities, including New Haven, as a proving ground for their avantgarde ideas of redevelopment
predicated upon comprehensive clearance and rebuilding – and helped to place the Oak Street
neighborhood in the path of the wrecking ball.
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CHAPTER II: URBAN RENEWAL AND MAYOR LEE
“Through the determination of a united community as exemplified by the Citizens Action
Commission, and with the help of Almighty God, we will achieve our common goal for New
Haven – a City free of slums and blight.”87 – Mayor Richard C. Lee
“Any city that does not set in motion by 1960 a comprehensive program to halt blight will
be flirting with municipal ruin… If present trends are allowed to continue, 30,000,000
Americans will be living in slums by 1975.”88 – Ed Logue
Enacted by Congress in 1949, the Federal Urban Renewal Program was designed to help
cities eliminate urban blight and rebuild rundown areas by providing them with “large subsidies
of public money and government power [to assist] the normal operations of the private
market.”89 This federal call to action endowed city governments with an unparalleled amount of
monetary support to stimulate projects of gigantic proportions in order to eradicate blighted areas
and overhaul/reinvent urban landscapes, thereby making redevelopment, as previously
envisioned by early-modern planners, possible. 90 When first conceived, Congress established
two primary guidelines for the program: 1) Maximum reliance was to be placed on private
enterprise, and 2) Local governments were to have responsibility for initiating and carrying out
specific urban renewal projects.91
In the span of just fifteen years, billions of dollars would eventually be used for over a
thousand projects, enveloping hundreds of cities and impacting the lives of millions of people,
leaving the mid-century metropolis carpeted with planned, widescale, destructive redevelopment
programs.92 As historian Francesca Russello Ammon writes in her book Bulldozer: Demolition

87

Richard C. Lee, New Haven Development Guide, 1960 New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 1960.
Edward J. Logue, “Urban Ruin – Or Urban Renewal,” N.Y. Times Magazine, November 9, 1958.
89
Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962 (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1964), 2.
90
William Koh, Urban Renewal and the Oak Street Neighborhood: Mayor Richard Lee’s Question for a Familiar
Future John Edwards College, April 2, 2012, 6.
91
Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, 16.
92
Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, 2-16.
88

25
and Clearance of the Postwar Landscape, “wrecking companies demolished buildings and
earthmoving contractors leveled land at an unprecedented pace and scale.” 93 While a relatively
diminutive urban center in comparison to larger cities with much greater populations, New
Haven latched onto this program in an extraordinary fashion, instigating sweeping physical
renovations that would define urban planning and redevelopment – the scars of such remain to
the present day.
While many other cities across the nation were experiencing physical and economic
deterioration, at the time, New Haven was considered a perfect laboratory for a redevelopment
endeavor designed at ‘salvaging urban America.’94 By all accounts, after the Second World War,
much of the City of New Haven was in total decay and disrepair. It was faced with an
atrophying, if not already entirely obsolete and dormant manufacturing base, extensive and
expanding poverty, a declining economy, a stagnating business/commercial center, the
increasing suburbanization of its upper/middle-class residents (and the subsequent loss of tax
revenue), and seemingly unlivable housing. The speed of the city’s overall urban decline was
breathtaking and the rising deplorable conditions within many of the immigrant neighborhoods
became a major object of concern to city officials. According to the census, by 1950, a third of
all New Haven’s housing was substandard. 95 As noted by author Allan R. Talbot in his book The
Mayor’s Game, which details Lee’s administration and the city’s political atmosphere, “In the
early nineteen-fifties ugliness and obsolescence were spreading over New Haven like weeds in
an unkempt garden, and not just in the poor neighborhoods.”96
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At the time, the conventional ideology was that “slums, like cancer, often spread unless
eliminated.” 97 Thus, many politicians and ‘urban experts’ (architects, engineers, city planners,
corporate executives, consultants, labor leaders, and demographers) sought a scapegoat for the
city’s overall physical despair and pointed to the Oak Street neighborhood as its worst section.98
To these ‘experts,’ it’s severe blight, the “run-down” and overcrowded “canyon of filth and
hopelessness” that made up the Oak Street neighborhood, would function perfectly as the ideal
location for an urban renewal project of unprecedented magnitude. 99 In fact, New Haven’s
Redevelopment Agency (RA), created in 1950 by Mayor William Celentano to facilitate renewal
by receiving grants, acquiring land, and selling it to private developers, had already designated
the neighborhood as its primary target, claiming it presented “the most danger to the City while
holding out great redevelopment promise.”100
Under Celentano, the last Republican mayor of New Haven, the RA obtained a federal
survey and planning grant for the Oak Street neighborhood and had even secured approval for
the clearance of fifteen acres, however it still lacked the necessary funding to move forward.101
This impasse may have been a consequence of Celentano’s “old-fashioned”/timid attitude
towards redevelopment, or rather, as Rae proclaims in City: Urbanism and Its End, his ability to
have “correctly evaluated the capacity of city government to conduct the kind of work that urban
renewal involved.”102 After all, it is important to realize that, at the time, redevelopment was
untried and acknowledged by many to be a costly endeavor, both fiscally and physically.
Additionally, some members of the City Plan Commission, aware that the establishment of a RA
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was the only way the city’s master plan could be implemented, raised concerns that such a strong
agency “might pervert the planning process by applying expedient solutions to long-range
problems.”103 As Talbot wrote, “Their fears were eventually to be realized not because the
agency perverted the planning process, but because it actually took it over.” 104
It was no secret to the public that Oak Street was being considered for redevelopment, as
in 1952, the New Haven Register announced that the city was “unable to afford maintaining” the
Oak Street area, which it considered to be “in greatest need of immediate attention… [as its]
expense… far exceeds [its] tax income.”105 However, in order for any politician to be able to
successfully put forth an acceptable and transformative redevelopment plan, it would require not
only the necessary political sway, but also unique ambition, commitment, and conviction to
“reject the traditional limitations [and] push aside the old boundaries.”106 If urban renewal were
to be implemented, it would have to become a central political policy. Hence, as Dahl wrote,
“very little happened [in New Haven] until redevelopment became attached to the political
fortunes of an ambitious politician.”107
Into this setting stepped Richard C. Lee. Born in 1916, Lee grew up in a cold-water flat in
Newhallville, a similarly grimy, decrepit, working-class neighborhood of New Haven, and as
such, was fully aware of the city’s decline, having had observed it first-hand. Dahl remarked on
Lee’s modest upbringing in the city and his extensive experience in New Haven life and politics,
which had served to mold him into a skillful politician with a large repertoire of abilities and a
“relentless drive to achieve his goals” – a tough and ruthless style that would define his political
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career and impact on the city. 108 Through Lee’s various positions of employment throughout the
city, from the New Haven Journal Courier newspaper, a staff member of the Chamber of
Commerce, head of Yale’s news bureau, and fourteen years as a New Haven alderman, he would
become very well-known and highly connected with the city’s political elite and business
community. This experience though, was tempered by two narrowly unsuccessful campaigns for
mayor in 1949 and 1951 (the latter of which Lee astonishingly lost by just two votes).109 Thus,
Lee, who had long coveted the mayoral position, felt forced to “escape the blinders of normal
politics” and attach his personal dynamism to a public cause if he was to become victorious.110
As a result, he made the physical reconstruction and socioeconomic revitalization of New Haven
his cause, running a ‘different kind’ of campaign – one which featured urban renewal as its
cornerstone.111

Lee stressed not merely the physical nature of
the city, but also the “moral, economic, and social
injustice of the slum [itself].”112 Similarly, he
recognized the risks of redevelopment as a new and
untried method of rehabilitating urban space, but
“thought if I could sell the program and educate the
people, they could take the rich diet of change.” 113
Lee had rested his campaign upon the notion that the
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city government could no longer cope with addressing the city’s problems – problems which
only redevelopment, on an exceptional and utterly destructive scale, could solve.114 Finally, in
1953, Lee defeated Celentano and, at the age of just thirty-seven, was elected Mayor of New
Haven. Almost immediately, he initiated a plan that he would later call the “rebirth” of New
Haven, which encompassed the aims of curbing middle-class relocation, eliminating slums,
rehabilitating obsolescent housing, and revitalizing the city’s economy. 115 But how would he
accomplish this? More specifically, how would the city obtain the necessary funding and avoid
the other problems that had inhibited its previous plans?
The answer was simple: the federal government and several of its newly crafted policies.
Twentieth century urban policy had become seemingly shaped directly around deliberate federal
intervention, for without federal assistance, any substantial urban renewal project would have
been impossible. Rae cites three specific factors which played a vital role in Lee’s
implementation of redevelopment in New Haven. The first dates back to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal, with the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), a federal agency that
was intended to reduce mortgage failure rates nationally, especially in and around cities.116 But
instead of assisting in revitalization, the HOLC marked the city’s historically poorer, and
predominately immigrant neighborhoods, such as Oak Street and Legion Avenue, as “high-risk”
to bankers, which matured into the discriminatory exercise of ‘redlining’ – the withholding of
private mortgage credit for purchase, repair, or renovation to those who resided in these areas
deemed to be hazardous.117 Simply put, money was to be denied from these ‘red’ areas, where it
was needed most, thereby leading to the further physical deterioration of housing conditions.
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The second factor was the massively subsidized construction of low-income housing
projects under what would become the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).118 Meant to be altruistic, these worked in concert with the HOLC and instead, served to
“expand and make permanent zones of poverty and racial segregation” – both factors in
designating Oak Street as one of, if not the, worst area in New Haven, as well as limiting the
ability of residents to privately improve their living conditions. 119 As such, Rae writes, “No
attempt to hinder school performance, or to encourage unemployment and even criminality,
could have been much better designed than the piling up of subsidized low-income housing in
exactly the places jobs were (or would become) hardest to find.”120 Thus, well-meaning federal
government programs, instead of serving to help cities, actually resulted in unintended,
unforeseen, and undesirable consequences.
Lastly, and most crucial to New Haven’s plans, was Title I of the Federal Housing Act of
1949, the first legislation which officially sought “the elimination of substandard and other
inadequate housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas… thus contributing to the
development and redevelopment of communities.” 121 Through the provision of government
loans, this authorized the expenditure of one billion dollars, along an additional half a billion in
grants, to cities for planning renewal projects and acquiring property to be cleared, with the cities
themselves being required to bear only one-third of the net costs of their projects (the federal
government would cover the other two-thirds).122 Consequently, these grants, according to Dahl,
enabled cities to acquire, clear, and sell land at a loss to redevelopers. 123 The City of New Haven
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would thoroughly exploit the federal Title I funds, ultimately garnering the largest urban renewal
allocation per capita in the entire country – some $120 million, approximately equivalent to
about $790 for each resident, a figure which vastly trumped other cities like New York, Boston,
and Chicago.124 The expansion of Title I in 1954 served to offer greater flexibility to city
governments for their projects and broadened the scope of urban renewal – on the other hand, it
effectively relegated the original goal of creating more affordable housing for low-income
residents to a lesser priority.125
Rae writes, “New Haven pursued urban renewal more vigorously, more ingeniously, and
more expensively (per capita) than any other city in the country.” 126 The city’s heavy
dependence on federal assistance was due to the fact that it had few alternative sources of
funding, particularly from the private sector. 127 As Jeanne Lowe observed in her 1967
comprehensive study of urban renewal, “Almost everything of consequence that has taken place
in New Haven in the past dozen years has been stimulated, put together and forwarded from City
Hall… The New Haven business community has shown little initiative.”128 Title I, combined
with the Federal Highway Act of 1956 (which provided more in state and federal highway
funds), thus became the impetus behind urban redevelopment nationwide, as it created newlyaccessible federal tools and the necessary capital that allowed cities to provide a viable
counterweight to the appeal of suburbia by physically altering disfavored areas.129 Lowe even
stated that “Cities have distorted the use of urban renewal in a frantic effort to squeeze the
highest use and largest return from Title I land for their slipping tax base.” 130 Lee, his
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administration, and the RA arguably utilized these federal policies to the greatest possible extent
in their pursuit to redevelop New Haven. 131
It is important to note that these federal funds, while widely accessible, were not just
simply handed out to cites. In fact, for a municipality to obtain the available federal resources, it
required a proficient and crafty redevelopment agency, and one that adhered to strict guidelines –
a crucial facet that allowed Lee and the city’s plans for urban renewal to crystallize. While the
RA was technically created during Celentano’s administration, Dahl claimed that it was actually
established as part of a political strategy formulated by Democrats on the Board of Aldermen,
which had included Lee himself, to take away the initiative from Celentano and the
Republicans.132 Regardless of any partisan approach, for the next two decades the RA would
continue to be dominated by city business interests, as displayed through the “second-string
nature” of its members and the constant support of the Chamber of Commerce.133 The economic
and social ‘notables’ of New Haven could not privately initiate redevelopment themselves (due
to the obvious issues of funding and assembling/uniting together), but would instead selectively
instigate the process in accordance with their own commercial desires through the RA, exerting
an indirect influence on the city’s plans – an approach which Dahl believed functioned as a
“pluralist democracy.”134
This group, which he labeled New Haven’s “subleaders,” certainly did not represent the
interests of the working class, the majority of the electorate. 135 Notably, Rotival, who would
serve as New Haven’s ‘planning consultant’ in 1951, also factored considerably in the RA’s
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plans, as the city used many of his ideas and proposals as the basis for their ‘Ten Point Program’
– their collection of broad objectives for redevelopment.136 Rotival’s original blueprint
effectively became the city’s ‘master plan’ and similarly provided the basic overall concept for
Lee’s project, as the new federal redevelopment regulations had made his notion of a dominant
‘arterial’ thoroughfare feasible. According to Talbot, the city planners had already negotiated the
construction of the Connecticut Turnpike (part of Interstate-95 along the harbor in New Haven)
with the State Highway Department, which had demonstrated the readiness to initiate the
building of some sort of downtown connector. 137
However, for Lee to successfully exploit these federal resources, he needed a skilled
team, and thus, he sought out “the smartest and most arrogant” people, eventually taking almost
a full term in office to appoint the members of his RA.138 Talbot wrote, “New Haven had the
plan and the leader. Now it needed a doer.” 139 As such, Lee’s most important addition to New
Haven redevelopment was the appointment of Ed Logue, later known as a titan and pioneer of
urban transformation, who served as Lee’s ‘right-hand man’ and head of the RA.140 Dubbed “the
master rebuilder,” Logue, a Yale graduate, was intelligent and vigorous, yet arrogant, assertive,
and hard-nosed.141 He was “an effective foil for Lee’s gregarious, persuasive political style,” and
was ultimately a formative figure in New Haven’s bid at renewal, exemplifying, on a national
level, how redevelopment could be executed. 142
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Given their two blatantly different personalities, the relationship between Lee and Logue
was remarkably tense. It was a surprise to many historians that it actually lasted as long as it did,
since the two would constantly fight, usually culminating in Lee firing his subordinate about
once or twice a week, only to have intermediaries “patch things up.”143 Regardless, both men
expertly got things done – Lee would “deliver the permissive consensus to legitimate urban
renewal and the considerable coercion it would require,” while Logue mastered the federal
regulations needed “to get at the money, and keep his operation free of corrupting influences.”144
“Keeping a man like Logue under wraps is something like hiding a tiger in a cellar,” wrote
Talbot.145 By his second year in the RA, Logue would become New Haven’s redevelopment
‘czar’ through his new role as Development Administrator, a “super-departmental position,”
which afforded him the oversight and control of all city agencies that were involved in
renewal.146 Dahl asserted that in another administration, the Development Administrator could
have been frustrated and helpless, but in Lee’s, Logue’s “furious drive and energy found infinite
outlets in redevelopment.”147 Logue’s post, along with his unofficial position as deputy mayor,
would provide him with a substantial amount of power, as before long, his word was in effect the
Mayor’s word.148 Simply put, Logue had become Lee’s “all-purpose lieutenant.”149 Based merely
upon the broad scope of the extensive amalgam of responsibilities for coordination, planning,
and control placed on Logue, one could plausibly speculate that he was the ‘power behind the
throne.’ Still, if some modern historians hold Lee responsible for the impact of redevelopment in
New Haven, then in turn, Ed Logue should be considered just as culpable.
Talbot, The Mayor’s Game, 22-23.
Rae, City, 319.
145
Talbot, The Mayor’s Game, 23.
146
Talbot, The Mayor’s Game, 23; Rae, City, 317.
147
Dahl, Who Governs?, 127.
148
Dahl, Who Governs?, 127.
149
Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, 275.
143
144

35
In 1955, Lee and Logue felt the incumbent director of the RA lacked the necessary drive
and zeal they desired and assigned Ralph Taylor into the position. 150 What made Taylor
attractive to them was his reputation, and in particular, the fact that he was well-respected as a
professional by his peers across the nation, thereby bringing a sought-after status to the city. This
would also specifically factor directly into the New Haven RA’s relationship with the federal
government. Taylor knew how to “cut through the interminable delays characteristic of
bureaucratic agencies” and exploited statutes and rules to gain concessions for New Haven
which reduced the cash contribution that the city was required to bear, making the city’s actual
financial payment much less than the supposed one-third of the total cost.151 These men were not
only some of the most highly regarded and nationally recognized professionals in the field of city
planning, but they were also shrewd, evidently possessing an ingenious ability to garner the
necessary financial backing for Lee’s ambitious project.152
Crucially, the RA, over which Lee held tight control, was able to successfully construct
the redevelopment plans and then finance them with their skill, connections, and speed. While
other cities were still debating whether to apply for federal funds, New Haven had already
secured a disproportionate share of what was available. 153 Author Fred Powledge noted that as a
result, such a strong and crafty RA became a “parallel government,” responsive to an “executivecentered order,” with Lee at the helm. 154 The RA not only pursued funding (and acquired it at a
proportionally tremendous rate), but also helped to “trick” the public into acceding to a
wholesale demolition program through the dissemination of photos, sketches, and maps “in
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quickly digestible form,” to both display and convey the city’s need for repair.155 Also, in their
pursuit of federal funding, the RA even staged and scripted ‘propaganda’ photographs to visibly
support/confirm the claims that some areas were indeed ‘slums,’ thereby further selling the need
for redevelopment.156
In addition to the abilities of his RA, Lee was also keenly able to circumvent any
opposition to his plans for redevelopment.157 One of his original campaign promises involved the
creation of a representative, ‘non-partisan citizens committee’ to spearhead a redevelopment
program within sixty days of taking office.158 But, due to the difficulties in finding a chairman,
this process instead took over nine months.159 Although his predecessor Celentano had described
it as a “ridiculous” idea, nonetheless, Lee created the Citizens Action Commission (CAC), which
was intended to function as an innovative means of ‘grass-roots’ community consultation for
urban renewal.160 This would essentially ‘sell’ the idea of redevelopment to those groups who
“remained fairly aloof from local politics” – a part of his promise for ‘widespread
representation,’ thereby ostensibly “bringing multiple New Haven voices to the table.” 161
While it seemed virtuous on paper, Dahl asserted that the CAC revealed the ‘hidden
hand’ that allowed the city’s economic leaders and leading civic personalities to have a
controlling role in the redevelopment of New Haven. 162 In fact, rather than consisting of a wide
range of the city’s residents, including people of various social classes, the foremost part of the
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CAC was a twenty-five man ‘executive’ committee comprised of New Haven’s technocratic elite
– the heads of large utilities, manufacturing firms, banks, and other businesses.163 Its members,
with Yale President A. Whitney Griswold as vice-chairman, were shrewdly selected to represent
the circle of influence within New Haven, what Lee called “the biggest muscles in New
Haven.”164 Possibly overlooked by Dahl was the fact that the CAC’s entire membership had
numbered over four hundred and included “every major economic and ethnic group in New
Haven… with the exception of Negros.”165 Still, these members were undoubtedly not as
influential as the men of the ‘executive committee,’ if at all, and seemingly had been left
remarkably uninformed on local affairs and city plans.
To Dahl, the CAC was “deliberately created by Mayor Lee” as a façade of civic
participation, appearing to mobilize public opinion and interest in urban renewal. 166 In actuality
though, the CAC was merely a “window dressing,” an “artificial constituency,” and a “corps of
loyal auxiliaries” who, through its continuous acquiescence, helped to “engender public support
for the [redevelopment] program and forestall disputes,” while selling renewal to the public and
providing “legitimacy and acceptability to the decisions of the leaders.” 167 It was a voice which
Lee could use to speak up on behalf of, and gain support for, the redevelopment process.168 It is
difficult to determine the direct contributions of the CAC, but as Dahl stated, it derived its
significance from its regular endorsement of the city’s renewal proposals, which had:
… made the program appear nonpartisan, virtually nullified the effectiveness of partisan
attacks, presented to the public an appearance of power and responsibility diffused
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among a representative group of community notables, and inhibited criticisms [of the
program] as ‘unrealistic’ or ‘unbusinesslike.’ 169
To Rae, the CAC acted as an alternative political organ, an “extragovernmental body,”
and was Lee’s “way of flattering to what remained of a business elite and of mobilizing it to his
purposes” – giving weight to his plans and long-term vision.170 Despite this, the aura of the
CAC’s nonpartisanship and respectability effectively legitimized Lee’s policies and helped him
mobilize the necessary momentum to overwhelm any resistance, politically and publicly. 171
Further, the CAC was outside the view of the various boards or established commissions
governing the line on which city government departments operated. 172 It was merely a
‘simulacrum’ for the reputed ‘supportive business elite,’ rather than the actual ‘citizens,’
operating as “a convincing surrogate” and forming “a regime structure that gave Lee leverage he
would otherwise have been without.”173 To author Raymond E. Wolfinger, it was “a
manufactured pressure group that increased support for Lee’s policies without… extending or
sharing influence over them” – “an elaborate and successful charade of citizen participation.”174
As Rae claims, “to use the phrase ‘Citizens Action Commission’ greatly stretched the ordinary
meaning of municipal citizenship.”175
“The CAC was a mechanism not for settling disputes but avoiding them altogether” – Lee
and Logue thought that whatever received the full assent of the CAC would not be strongly
opposed by the public community. 176 To them, the CAC served as public opinion, reflecting the
desires and viewpoints of the upper stratum and business elite of New Haven, thus providing a
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mechanism by which to test and shape proposals for support.177 As Talbot wrote, “The fact was
that the CAC never made a recommendation that had not already been proposed by Lee and
never charted a line that Lee and his staff were not already following.” 178 In contrast with
Celentano, under Lee, the entire pace of redevelopment had altered, primarily due to his RA and
CAC, vehicles outside of regular city government and politics which functioned as technocratic
mechanisms to provide support for his plans of comprehensive renewal. 179 While Dahl claimed
that by creating the CAC Lee “virtually
decapitated the opposition,” it is
essential to examine what, if any,
opposition existed, and if so, to what
degree it might have threatened his
plans.180

Based upon Dahl’s idea that the
relationship between leaders and their
constituents is reciprocal, it is therefore conceivable that the collective influence of the political
stratum could have been sufficient to put an end to redevelopment – if there was division over
the city’s plans for renewal, Lee’s program would have unquestionably faltered.181 Although the
organized interest groups of New Haven were divided and simply too weak individually to carry
on the task of initiating and coordinating redevelopment themselves, Dahl believed that together
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their opposition would have easily been strong enough to block any project.182 As an example,
the First National Bank had to be persuaded by the RA to support redevelopment. Yet, had it
instead concluded that it was not in its best interest, and other banks joined in opposition, “it
could hardly have moved forward even under the skillful auspices of Lee, Logue, and Taylor.” 183
Yale also possessed a big stake in redevelopment. While it had always been an influential
force in the city, Yale’s role in the twentieth century had become much more subtle. Dahl
claimed that it was in “a weak political position,” citing the school’s titanic ownership of taxexempt property and the apolitical nature of its faculty.184 Wolfinger similarly agreed with this
belief, noting that the University had “remarkably little direct impact on New Haven politics”
and that despite all the numerous apparent reasons for inserting itself into the city’s political
arena, Yale “eschewed such a role.”185 However, both authors seemingly underestimated the
power, wealth, and influence of Yale as the major contributing economic factor in New Haven,
as well as the close relationship between President Griswold and Lee. G. William Domhoff, who
reexamined and critiqued Dahl’s analysis of political power in New Haven, claimed that Dahl
had incorrectly judged Yale’s role in urban renewal as ‘impotent,’ for instead, “the most
important institutions in a local economy are likely to have great political power.” 186 Still,
Griswold and Yale, like the other interest groups of the city, could not push redevelopment
forward themselves, and, while the University’s cooperation with the city’s plans was useful, and
frankly necessary, its opposition could have posed a formidable obstacle. 187 Yale’s support, or
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mere passivity, was therefore critical for any form of New Haven redevelopment. If the school
had resisted the plans, “the whole Oak Street project would have died aborning.” 188
There is also evidence that Yale actually welcomed redevelopment, specifically that
which focused on Oak Street, as the slum was located alongside the Grace-New Haven Hospital
and the Yale Medical Center, bordering the University’s growing campus.189 In fact, when
Rotival had first published his own plans, there was “a lot of discussion of the Oak Street area as
separating Yale,” including concerns over protecting the University as the city’s major
resource.190 According to Talbot, Griswold had “despised the grime, filth, and decay which
marked the home of Yale… [and] was not content to let the University ride with the problems of
the city.”191 Thus, it is even conceivable that he envisioned redevelopment as beneficial to the
university, which was “hard pressed” for housing – a Yale official stated in 1957, “this was not
sheer altruism of Yale’s part. It was a case of… truly enlightened self-interest.”192
As author Scott Greer pointed out, urban renewal required “the cooperation of private
citizens; [the] residents in the neighborhoods, owners of property to be redeveloped, voters in
referenda… and investors in the real estate market.” 193 Concerning the people of the city, it
appears that there was never a discernable popular demand for measures to reverse the physical
and economic malaise of New Haven, though citizens were evidently discontent. 194 Given the
little information or data available for such public opinion, it remains unclear as to whether the
majority truly supported or opposed the redevelopment. What is clear though, is how they voted
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– the people of New Haven re-elected Lee to eight straight terms until 1970. His first bid for
election as incumbent, arguably his most important, was a considerable victory, as Lee won by a
vote of nearly two-to-one.195 A majority vote against Lee, with urban renewal as the keystone of
his administration, would have certainly signified the electorate’s “veto” on redevelopment, but
his polling success indicated the opposite – to Lee it was a green light to further his crusade of
renewal.196 Greer stated that in New Haven, “Mayor Lee and his advisers took his startling
success at the polls as a popular plebiscite on the [renewal] program.”197 Likewise, Dahl wrote:
In effect the role of the electorate was not to demand redevelopment, to initiate it, or
directly to influence concrete decision, but at two-year intervals to vote for or against a leader
identified with redevelopment and so to express what would be interpreted as support for, or
disapproval of, the program.198
It is quite possible that those who were primarily affected, the communities of Legion
Avenue and Oak Street, simply did not have enough power or possess the votes necessary to
thwart Lee. Wolfinger asserted that it is conceivable that many simply did not expect that the
project “would come to pass,” as there had been “much talk and little action.” 199 According to
Hartford Courant author Charles F. J. Morse, the displaced individuals did “not want to be
branded as obstructionists,” but attempted to make the “plight of the established businessman”
understood by city officials before endorsing the proposal.200 Morse likened the city’s plan to the
course of a paper plane – the residents in attendance “could clearly follow [the plan] when it was
aloft, but it’s exact position was unclear when it dropped to the ground.” 201 Many questions, such
as relocation, were left unanswered. Reflecting on the general novelty of redevelopment, it is
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also quite possible that many were simply unaware of its substantial consequences and
ramifications. David A. Wallace, an urban planner, stated, “By and large, people don’t
understand what we’re after – or even what we’re talking about. This is fortunate, for if they did,
we’d all have to run for cover.”202
Mandi Jackson writes “voices of dissent hardly register in the public record.” 203
According to her, Lee and New Haven also utilized the city’s two local newspapers, the Register
and Journal Courier in crafting civic consensus. A former newspaperman, Lee was adept in
public relations, aware of the power and politics of the press, and consequently exerted his
ingenuity to command space in news columns, as he frequently “‘plugged stories,’ offered
professional journalistic advice, and exchanged gossip” with reporters.204 To a degree, Jackson
discredits the accuracy or veracity of these newspapers, citing specific phrasing that served to
downplay the true nature of renewal to readers – headlines such as “State Ready to Acquire Oak
Street Connector Land” suggested that the area, a dense urban space, “had been waiting like an
open frontier for the state to claim it.”205 This article concerned a public hearing on the project in
December 1955, in which the Journal Courier wrote, “Not a single voice was raised in
opposition to the overall plan… there seemed to be no one who disagreed that the slum area must
go.”206 Jackson also commented on the newspaper’s description and characterization of the
audience in a meeting two months prior, which “suggested that none of the families to be
displaced were so distraught by the prospect [of redevelopment], that they would show up.” 207
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Either the residents were not present at these meetings, they were not afforded the opportunity to
speak, or they were simply intimidated by the city’s testimony. 208
The city also carefully arranged public meetings in precise ways designed to minimize
the possibility of encountering dissent.209 Strategies such as holding as few assemblies as
possible under the law, scheduling them at times in the day (usually in the afternoon) when most
working people could not attend, or limiting any announcements/public notice ahead of time
were just some of the devices used by the city government. 210 Regardless, civic attitudes, for or
against redevelopment, as well as involvement/activity in Lee’s public meetings, was
meaningless in the face of eminent domain and ‘the wrecking ball.’
Without significant, threatening opposition, armed with a stream of substantial federal
funding and project-enabling laws, close control over an active and fruitful RA, a coup de maître
in the CAC, and a precise location for his first urban renewal project, Lee, now unbridled and
unrestrained, was finally able to launch the elaborate and ‘innovative’ plan of ‘destructive
rehabilitation’ which he had so desperately sought. Lee could finally amputate the arm in order
to save the whole, and the Oak Street neighborhood, the “worst of nine blighted areas in New
Haven,” a “hard core of cancer which had to be removed,” would become a nationally publicized
testing ground for urban renewal and total slum clearance. 211
While Lee’s sentiment was extreme, describing the Oak Street neighborhood as
consisting primarily of “whore houses and gin mills,” he was not completely incorrect, as the
conditions were indeed terrible.212 It was the densest and poorest community, replete with
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choked streets, “human misery,” and archaic, fetid tenement buildings, many without hot water
or electricity, teeming with “troubled and troublesome families” packed like sardines.213 HOLC
appraisers (while following vague assessment nomenclature) designated it as a ‘red’ area with a
grade D rating (the lowest possible mark) – a neighborhood that, Rae writes, was to be avoided
by bankers “like a case of syphilis.”214 A “disgrace to the city,” eighty-six percent of the
residential structures were classified as substandard and not ‘up to code.’215 The neighborhood
boasted one of the city’s two public baths, a number of “dubious” saloons, and a heavy
concentration of prostitutes, derelicts, and petty gambling houses – to city officials, it was
“detrimental to the community’s health, morals, and welfare.”216
To Lee, or any sensible individual, the area was rotting, unquestionably containing
largely antediluvian living conditions, with housing and commercial facilities that appeared to be
remnants from a time long past. The New Haven Redevelopment Agency would later write, “The
social and human sickness of [Oak Street] had reached epidemic proportions.” 217 Recalling a trip
to the neighborhood in 1951, Lee stated:
I went into the homes on Oak Street… I came out… and I sat on the curb and I was just
as sick as a puppy. Why the smell of this building; it had no electricity, it had no gas, it had
kerosene lamps, light had never seen those corridors in generations. The smells… It was just
awful… [and] right there was when I began to tie in all these ideas we’d been practicing in city
planning for years in terms of human benefits that a program like [urban renewal] could reap for
a city.218
This characterization, while bitter, was not an over-exaggeration. Oak Street’s problems
were real and acute, and the abysmal conditions could certainly have posed numerous
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health/safety threats. 219 Many of the houses were without central heating, running water, and
were notoriously infested with rats and cockroaches. 220 Crime was not unknown to the area,
although possibly not to the extreme extent claimed by Lee or city officials. To Rae, it was a
“certified reality” that the area was indeed a ‘slum,’ “a community abscess,” as many of the
bulldozed businesses and homes were truly hopelessly dilapidated, decaying, and abandoned. 221
One New Haven resident stated years after its destruction, “That neighborhood was simply
horrible. There were rats as big as cats running around the streets and a bar on every corner.”222
Lowe wrote that the Oak Street neighborhood was a “repository for the human backwash of the
city, where families of six crowded in two unheated rooms and where rats terrorized the sleep of
children. Five cent bathhouses stood next to shops of pennyante merchants. Debris piled deep in
its alleys and was left to molder there.”223
The modern, flourishing, urban epicenter which Lee envisaged as his ‘model city’ could
not co-exist with such “malodorous,” run-down structures and their poor inhabitants.224 He and
the city officially concluded that the neighborhood was simply beyond repair. Thus, in
accordance with the notions pontificated by the numerous urban renewal planners across the
nation, Oak Street was so badly deteriorated that it had to be demolished in its entirety. “It’s
nothing more and nothing less than an effort to rebuild the declining heart of an old city,” stated
Lee in 1957.225 Oak Street was a ‘deficit area,’ not only economically and aesthetically, but even
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more importantly, to Lee, “in terms of [its] moral impact on our communities.”226 In his eyes,
this was a ‘community renewal’ program – the rotten spot to be cut from the apple, regardless of
the financial and human cost.
Once the planning was complete and the financial concerns were, for the time being,
satisfied, city officials “hurled a devastating attack” against the Oak Street area, citing the crime
rate, sub-standard dwellings, fire/health/safety issues, high welfare costs, low tax return, traffic
hazards, and the overall unpleasant environment 227 It was believed that this was the “first time
that any city in the nation… presented so complete a case for slum clearance.” 228 City officials
were similarly adamant about the total elimination of the area. The Police Chief stated, “The city
must ‘remove the environment where criminals are comfortable,’” while the Fire Chief declared
that “The only answer is ‘to tear out the whole area and rebuild it along sound lines.’” 229 With
reference to these statements, Lowe acknowledges a political cartoon that arose around this time
that depicted the city department heads huddled together in the Mayor’s office wherein Lee was
shown pointing his finger at them, stating, “You will all freely testify in your own words why
Oak Street must go.”230 To Wolfinger, “They all had nothing but bad words for the area and
good words for the project.”231 Jackson eloquently wrote:
At these required public hearings… rather than making a case for slum clearance and the
need for (and existence of) a good highway construction plan, they orchestrated and unleashed
an arsenal of expert testimony to vilify the neighborhood and its residents. Rather than
demonstrate proof of any plan for relocation or rehousing, they dehumanized the neighborhood’s
inhabitants to detract from that question. The hearing put the neighborhood – rather than the
urban renewal project – on trial, and allowed no witnesses for the defense.232
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Both of the city’s newspapers would also call for the need for immediate city-wide
enforcement of strict housing codes as a result of the spread of disease and intense overcrowding,
citing the death of an infant and the area’s extraordinary rat population – instances that were
emphasized and dramatized by Lee, Logue, and the RA as cause for swift relocation.233 But,
although the physical conditions were abhorred by Lee and the city, the Oak Street area was still
a highly integrated neighborhood and home to many of New Haven’s immigrants. However,
since it was not part of the upper-class or ‘white’ America (WASP), it was not recognized as a
viable community, either by the political powers within the city or Yale’s sociologists. 234 It was
seen as a threat to society, and, as New Haven’s worst slum, had made itself the city’s first target
for renewal – a result which had been facilitated by federal subsidies and the impact of political
power/influence upon public opinion. Not surprisingly, the New Haven Board of Aldermen
unanimously approved the Oak Street Project. 235
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CHAPTER III: THE OAK STREET PROJECT
“Eviction notices are sent to voters, there are endless perplexities and tortuous negotiations, and
there is the possibility of a large and very visible failure.”236
“I am confident that in years to come the Oak Street Connector will become a symbol of our
rebirth as a leading New England community.”237 – Richard C. Lee
Presently, if one were to drive through what used to be Oak Street area, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to picture the neighborhood as it existed prior to redevelopment.
What was once a vibrant, colorful community, full of character and brimming with a myriad of
highly integrated people, now exists as an empty void. The extensive demolition of the Oak
Street Project caused a drastic and lasting transformation of the urban landscape – one which was
specifically promulgated by Mayor Lee and the City of New Haven in order to solve the
countless problems that were overcoming the city.238
The plan for Lee’s flagship project was far from simple. Through the elimination of the
area “with one of the highest quotients of substandard housing [and] high crime incidence” in the
city, the Oak Street Project set out to fulfill several broad objectives: (1) strengthen the
residential area by providing better living facilities (“adequate desirable housing”); (2) improve
traffic circulation (“[assist] the orderly flow of traffic”) through the removal of the antiquated
street pattern which had developed into “one of the most serious arterial traffic problems in the
city”; (3) increase the availability of off-street parking; (4) provide new sites for residential and
business construction (“to serve and support the more intensive new uses proposed for an area
that abuts the business, institutional, and community center”); (5) relocate the area’s residents
(“[move] families now living in substandard slum quarters to decent, safe, and sanitary

236

William Lee Miller, The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society: An Encounter with a Modern City (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), 149.
237
Lee, “Annual State of City Message to the New Haven Board of Aldermen,” 1956.
238
Silver, Interview with Kassow.

50
dwellings”); (6) reduce safety hazards and crime; (7) create free access to and from the city,
specifically the downtown area (“the orderly channeling of traffic”); and (8) reduce
maintenances in the area and stop the spread of ‘deterioration.’239
The belief was that altogether, these would help reverse the flight of middle-income
families to the suburbs, improve the general conditions of the area, and effectively revitalize the
city’s economy.240 New road construction and reducing traffic congestion were emphasized. 241 In
addition to augmented downtown parking, it was thought that this would increase New Haven’s
shopping capacity, an element vital to Lee’s vision. This was particularly fueled by a late 1956
survey of residents in the Greater New Haven Area that indicated forty percent were shopping
downtown less than they had in years prior, with fifty-two percent citing parking disadvantages
as the central issue.242 Even more remarkable was the fact that the city’s share of all retail sales
in the Greater New Haven Area had plunged from eighty-eight percent in 1948, to just fortyeight in 1963.243 As Lowe wrote, the rise of the automobile “threatened to choke off the lifeblood
of the city’s commercial heart… to go shopping downtown was slow and nerve-wracking; to find
a parking place in center city was almost impossible.”244
Rotival’s ideas which emphasized the significance of accommodating the automobile
were crucial to Lee’s plan – specifically the introduction of a thoroughfare to funnel vehicles
directly into the city. As such, the essential feature of New Haven’s redevelopment plan, its
centerpiece, would be the ‘Oak Street Connector.’ Envisaged as the new “gateway to New
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Haven,” this would be a high-speed, multi-lane ‘superhighway,’ linking Interstate-95, and later,
Interstate-91 (both southeast of the city center) with Route 34 (which extended from the
neighboring western suburbs), providing limited-access exits and entrances, and allowing
commuters to simply drive straight downtown, thus pumping “new life blood into New Haven’s
heart.”245 As Marisa Angell Brown states, the Connector would be the device to lure people back
from the suburbs into the city by providing faster, easier access.246
This ‘mega-road’ expressway would then be piggybacked by the subsequent Church
Street Redevelopment Project, another undertaking that involved the tearing down and complete
rebuilding of New Haven’s central business district, adding massive department stores (Macy’s
and Malley’s – both of which are long gone, closing in 1990 and 1981, respectively).247 As Lee
had stated in 1959, “By 1965, I predict we will have one of the most modern downtown
shopping centers in America.”248 To him, the success of the Church Street Project was wholly
dependent upon the Connector – its function in expediting traffic and facilitating parking was the
means to the revitalization of the city’s central business district. Simply put, it was the necessary
catalyst for the comprehensive plans of redevelopment in New Haven. The proposed impact of
the Oak Street Project on the nature of the city’s residential area, along with that of the Church
Street Project upon the city’s commercial district, was, as Talbot wrote, “akin to a heart
transplant; New Haven was trying to revive a half-dead patient with massive, experimental
surgery.”249
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With regard to the Oak Street Project, first portion of the proposal called for the
demolition of the entire area between George Street and Oak Street, stretching from Park Street
to the newly established Interstate highways along the harbor near South Orange Street.250 Entire
streets – all of the housing and businesses – were to be annihilated, paved over with an immense,
450-foot-wide trail of concrete and asphalt. The Connector would then occupy much of the land,
along with the erection of accompanying new, privately developed buildings and public housing
complexes.251 This was to be later followed by the razing of Legion Avenue, which, as the
second part of the Oak Street Project, would finally connect the highway spur from its downtown
terminus at York Street to Route 34.252 Eventually, this would intersect at Ella T. Grasso
Boulevard (as it was later named), although it was originally planned to extend several miles
west over the West River
Memorial Park to link
directly with Route 34 in the
Maltby Lakes region of West
Haven.253 As Jackson writes,
“The project was an
ingenious marriage of
highway construction and
slum clearance.”254
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Urban renewal, which had been sought in New Haven for decades, was finally brought to
fruition at an unprecedented scale in 1956, along with a flurry of national attention.255 The image
that appeared was shockingly graphic – scenes of total annihilation comparable to “the open
areas found in many bomb ravaged cities of Europe” from the Second World War. 256 Ultimately,
upon the project’s ‘completion,’ approximately 10 square blocks and over 46 acres were cleared,
about 3,000 people, including 886 families, were displaced, 250 businesses were demolished,
and over 2,650 buildings were razed to the ground (since many historians have tended to group
the Oak Street and the Legion Avenue neighborhoods together, each of which were demolished
in the 1950’s and 1960’s respectively, it is difficult to discern whether these statistics are
individual totals, or are representative of the combination of both).257 Millions in federal subsidy,
city funding, and private investment, were spent on land acquisition, the difficult and intricate
relocation process, wholesale demolition, and arduous construction.258 In essence, the entire
community was literally and completely obliterated to make room for the new proposed uses and
the massive Oak Street Connector.
The Connector opened on October 26, 1959, but it only extended a mile-long, from I-95
to Church Street, ending brusquely at College Street, where the vestiges of the imagined tunnel
can still be seen today.259 Several factors are directly responsible for this abbreviated and
abortive result: numerous delays (particularly in its extension to Route 34), New Haven’s
overburdened planning (namely several extensive and fairly concurrent projects throughout the
city), and, most crucially, the strict cutback of federal subsidies and the shortfall of private
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development and investment.260 As Martin Anderson noted, during the late 1950’s, there was an
apparent disenchantment and intense scrutinization from the Eisenhower Administration
concerning the redevelopment program nationally, which led to a “tightening up of urban
renewal regulations.”261 In fact, Lee recalled the President’s sentiment as surly, bordering on
hostile – it is claimed that he had even said to the Mayor, “For Chrissakes, you got half the
Goddamn United States Treasury in New Haven! Why should we give you any more money?”262
Consequently, with the evaporation of the necessary federal funding, Lee was unable to afford
the acquisition and demolition of Legion Avenue in order to build the extension of the highway,
linking Route 34 to the Connector’s ‘dead end’ at York Street until 1965.263
Compounding this, the state also continuously refused to provide Lee with funding for
the second section of the project, primarily due to the estimated increase in citizen displacement
and the rise of public resistance, most notably through the ‘Anti-Route 34 Coalition.’264 This
consisted of a group of community organizations that were specifically opposed to the rumored
creation of a ‘ring road,’ an “inner circumferential loop highway,” which would have involved
not just an extension of the Oak Street Connector to Route 34, but more importantly, the
encirclement of the entire city.265 As seen in numerous large cities across the world, the concept
of this ‘ring road’ would technically streamline urban transportation, but at a cost. Its
construction could be devastating, impacting not only those in the path of a fully completed
Connector, but also thousands of other housing units and businesses all around New Haven,
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amputating/isolating various additional neighborhoods from the downtown area, if not
destroying them entirely.266
This provokes a significant question: Why did a coalition of substantial community
opposition rise up against the Connector at that particular point in time, and only when it related
to the larger ‘ring road’ project, rather than earlier, before the demolition of Oak Street/Legion
Avenue? Jackson believes that the answer lies in the superficial differences between the 1950’s
and 1960’s, the latter of which brought about various social movements and increased citizen
participation, all of which came to a head in New Haven during that period.267 Even if this
assumption is accurate, the fact that such a plan would have affected a much greater number and
a wider scope of residents than the Oak Street Project should also be considered a significant, if
not determinative, factor. To Jackson, this rumored ‘ring road’ “had to be opposed virulently, or
else authorities would be encouraged in their ‘dream of making the city merely… the nexus of a
unique set of highways.’”268 Rachel D. Carley adds that this scheme was vehemently resisted
because many viewed it as simply another project “geared to the convenience of out-of-towners
driving into the city at the expense of the people already living there.” 269
Overall, the Oak Street Project was simply too complex, involving and relying upon the
successful interplay of too many working parts. Bruce Campbell Landis wrote, “Given the nature
of the process, the number of actors involved and their conflicting goals, [there] is little wonder
that renewal takes a long time… It is not surprising that many projects fell by the wayside.” 270
To Greer, the indiscriminate accumulation of various different goals only served to complicate
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the plan, stating, “They roll up into a snowball of directives that allows no clear hierarchy of
intentions and, therefore, no priorities.”271 The implementation of an audacious, comprehensive,
and multifaceted development program, involving several distinct projects all planned
simultaneously through the use of a city ‘master’ blueprint, simply proved unproductive. In fact,
just a month after land acquisition for the Oak Street Project had commenced, the city even
began planning a fourth redevelopment project. 272 Thus, one could assume that once the city had
stopped the construction of the Connector at York Street in 1959, it would never successfully be
fully extended, as by the time Lee wished to proceed, the city had already ‘moved on’ and begun
redeveloping other areas. The project was also too idealistic – Lee and New Haven had “become
overly optimistic in their projections” and the idea of what they thought they could actually
achieve.273 Talbot wrote, “In the face of urban renewal disruptions and problems, Lee would
exude confidence and optimism sometimes to the point of self-delusion.”274
Into this mix lay the fact that the provision of federal funding to acquire the land did not
ensure that private developers would actually be found, and if so, that that they would “make a
success of it.”275 Lee had banked the outcome of the project upon the belief that private
developers would be lining up at the chance to build above the rubble of Oak Street. Not only did
this not transpire, but dissatisfaction also arose with the overall operation of the program – and
specifically, the realization that it was not as lucrative or profitable as was first believed. 276
Although the city would obtain some private initiative “improvements,” most notably in three
‘Towers’ apartment complexes and the $15 million Southern New England Telephone Company
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(SNET) building, these failed to restore the condition of the area’s residential and commercial
status. Additionally, while there purportedly were numerous preliminary discussions and
“expected” potential investments/constructions, as reported by the Register and Journal Courier,
no firm commitments/agreements or tangible plans for any such private development would
materialize.277 Perhaps with some exaggeration, Wolfinger stated, “No consideration had been
given to specific re-use possibilities when the land was cleared.” 278 He also noted evidence of
this effect upon the RA – the parcel purchased by SNET was purposely sold below its assessed
value, as the city was “very anxious to unload land” and get the project underway. 279 Even if the
anticipated volume of buildings had been constructed – ideologies that the Connecticut National
Bank described as nothing more than “heroic projects of monumental proportion” – it is highly
doubtful that such a radical transformation of the physical environment could instantaneously
‘fix’ the area.280
Current New Haven Economic Development Administrator Michael Piscitelli believes
that part of the underlying problem was that the architecture of some of the buildings that sprung
out of the urban renewal movement were not adaptable for different or future uses, and simply
“did not stand up to the test of time.”281 While originally imagined as “an avenue of modern
architecture from one end of the city to the other,” this would not come to fruition, as the scarce
private investments yielded, for the most part, rather bland, featureless, isolated, and
“increasingly sterile” architecture that would have to be constantly rebuilt or even demolished. 282
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One such example would stem from the New Haven’s “biggest auction ever.”283 In 1957, the city
publicly offered three square blocks of the recently demolished Oak Street area and, because of
preceding negotiations with the city, it was presumed that Griswold and Yale would acquire the
parcels, primarily due to the University’s severe housing shortage.284 But shockingly, the
University was outbid (an astounding $1,150,000 sum – almost half a million more than the
RA’s appraisal) by a Boston-based syndicate – a bid so large that it would eventually produce a
ripple effect, resulting in “serious financing problems,” extended construction delays, and several
years later, an apartment complex which Lee abhorred and described as, “the most God-awfullooking thing I ever laid eyes on.”285 This clearly demonstrates some of the issues created by an
overriding reliance upon private development to ensure the success of a redevelopment project
and, particularly for New Haven, the arguably unexceptional and undistinguished architecture
that it had produced.
Similarly, the editor of Architectural Forum claimed that the SNET building looked “like
it was designed by the janitor.”286 To Powledge, its drab construction “quickly took on the patina
of a faded and abandoned Holiday Inn.”287Likewise, the New Haven Coliseum, a sports
arena/venue completed in 1972, was another shoddy structure strewn around the Connector – just
one of the many buildings borne out of the redevelopment project that, despite its proclivity
towards modernism, would quickly deteriorate and eventually be demolished.288 As Carley
claims, “The architecture synonymous with redevelopment now symbolizes its failures.” 289
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The swept table of flattened urban fabric encouraged almost instant explosive newness in
architectural expression. As experimental as their predecessors were conventional, these
visionary pop-ups energetically rejected traditional neighbors to make sense of the scorched
earth upon which they sat… New designs self-consciously rejected the traditional ways buildings
met the needs of their users… While some of these models of invention worked… others were
terminally miscalculated. 290
The architecture of the Oak Street Project not only shaped the possible potential uses for
the area (and led to additional demolition and future reconstruction), but it also changed the way
Lee, Logue, and the city thought about redevelopment. Initially, during its construction stage, the
Oak Street Project was a major source of pride and a sense of accomplishment for the
administration. However, later, after some of the buildings had been completed, Talbot explained
that their “drab design” and “generally sterile appearance” convinced Lee and his redevelopment
staff that total clearance was not always the best answer to pressing urban neighborhood
problems and that more attention would have to be paid to design.291
Further complicating this was the overall lack of desire within the private sector to
develop, a situation which arose largely from the increasing reluctance of the federal government
and financial institutions to lend money for projects in these negatively viewed areas such as Oak
Street.292 Under the weight of both political pressures and “red tape,” the construction process
slowed down, adding to the frustration of municipal officials and private developers.293
According to Anderson, many of the project’s commercial investors, including Roger Stevens
(New Haven’s primary private developer), were real estate executives who were unquestionably
motivated more by profit than the social intent and were unconcerned with adhering to the city’s
goal of revitalization – “such men are the entrepreneurs of urban renewal.”294 These redevelopers
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were essential to the success of any urban renewal endeavor, as “without them, projects can
produce little beyond embarrassing amounts of vacant land.” 295 For New Haven, the critical
financial investment from the private sector had simply failed to materialize, slowing work to a
halt, even though the demolition of the Oak Street neighborhood had already taken place.296 To
Carley, “The proposed redevelopment sites gaped, dreary and defeated, the ultimate emblems of
unfulfilled promise.”297
Apart from its brief, four-block highway spur, the intended ‘superhighway’ connecting
Route 34 to I-95 through Legion Avenue and Oak Street was never completed. 298 Over the
decades since its creation, New Haven, strapped for cash, sold off much of the vacant,
undeveloped land in its possession. The state though, still retained the ‘right-of-way’ for the
parcels which were to be used for the Connector, so the city peddled the adjoining air rights, the
space above the area, leading to the creation of the mammoth parking structure known as the Air
Rights Garage at the
intersection of York
Street. Interestingly, the
city still maintained
innovative plans for the
Connector to continue as
a ‘below-grade roadway’
running beneath it.299
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This though was a delusion, with the fantasy of the highway’s completion perishing with
the recent construction of various amenities for Yale, University, Yale-New Haven Hospital, and
several bioscience buildings on repurchased right-of-way land. Where Lee had once envisioned a
massive highway stretching into the heart of his city, there now stands numerous structures, such
as the Pfizer New Haven Clinical Research Unit, the Alexion Tower, and the 101 College Street
building. The latter, which is currently being built, is enmeshed with New Haven’s Downtown
Crossing Project, which will
attempt to negate the damage
caused by the Oak Street Project
by reconnecting the portions of the
city physically separated by the
Connector, essentially “stitching
the city back together,” and
thereby theoretically restoring the
flow of activity.300 To Dickinson, this venture is simply “the infrastructural healing of a massive
civic error.”301 In all, Lee’s Connector, which was supposed to ‘save’ New Haven, became a
series of the flattened lots along Legion Avenue – parking lots and vacant “grass-covered
stretches of emptiness,” scattered amongst other non-descript edifices and Yale property.302
Today, the Oak Street Connector runs directly into the Air Rights Garage and exists
merely as a glorified highway exit ramp. Lee’s expensive and innovative throughfare, one which
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he hoped would become his legacy, now serves as a “highway to nowhere,” effectively splitting
New Haven by segregating the Hill neighborhood from the rest of the city.303

(Recent view of Legion Avenue’s flattened swaths of emptiness and parking lots)

(‘Before’ and ‘After’ aerial photographs of Oak Street)
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In Dickinson’s words, it has endured as more of a liability than an asset to the city – “Its raison
d'être, that slicing highway, failed to happen, and the Air Rights Garage now presents the gaping
maw of a man-made cavern to those zooming into the hospital side of town.”304 Poignantly,
William Holt and Donald Celmer note that instead of bringing life into the city, the Oak Street
Connector “took it away – accelerating the urban exodus, fragmenting neighborhoods, and
further depleting city centers of amenities and social life.” 305
On a larger scale, the Oak Street Project must be viewed as much more than just a
physical renewal – it was a human renewal, producing significant effects upon the relocated,
former residents of the neighborhood. Local redevelopment authorities were required by law to
“assist displaced families in finding decent, safe, and sanitary housing… within their financial
means.”306 This proved to be a challenging process for Alvin Mermin, Relocation Officer for the
New Haven Housing Authority, as the moving and resettling of the Oak Street inhabitants “ran a
wide gamut of human responses.”307 He recalled incidents where he witnessed tantrums,
indignation, apathy, and having doors slammed in his face, only to be contrasted with warm,
joyful receptions and a degree of acceptance.308 Enticed by the promise of new homes, cleaner
streets, and safer blocks, some residents were seemingly “delighted to hear that their dwellings
[were] going to be demolished” and that they could “graduate” from the slum conditions of Oak
Street.309 Some though, were simply indifferent towards their forced relocation. 310
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Lowe believed that the delicate problem of relocation was truly “the miracle of Oak
Street” – the result of the city’s dedicated and ingenious relocation staff who spared no effort in
the “peaceful, personalized rehousing” of the former slum dwellers. 311 Since it was property of
the State Highway Department, the city was not legally obliged to take any responsibility in the
relocation of the hundreds of residents displaced by the Connector, but according to Lowe, the
Housing Authority nonetheless took on that burden.312 Based upon such evidence, it appears that
the City of New Haven attempted to handle the substantial residential relocation caused by
redevelopment in an orderly and ‘humane’ way. This though, may not be an entirely accurate
portrayal. Mermin estimated that throughout his eleven-year tenure as Relocation Officer, over
22,000 individuals were relocated, while the true total, encompassing the entirety of New Haven
redevelopment, may actually be much closer to 30,000, indicating that roughly twenty percent of
the city’s entire residential population was compelled to move under the Lee administration. 313
Some historians claim that the relocation triggered by New Haven’s redevelopment
projects was actually beneficial, as it served to improve the circumstances of the displaced
residents. In this regard, Ammon cites various instances, specifically the healthier/ameliorated
conditions of newly constructed housing, which enhanced the livability of the physical
environment of the neighborhoods. 314 Some New Haven residents, although most likely not those
from Oak Street/Legion Avenue, claimed they were glad for the demolition and believed that its
former denizens should be grateful.315 It is important to note though, that the common trend prior
to redevelopment was that those who could afford to move, would do so, and more often than
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not, move away into other, possibly ‘better’ areas of the city. 316 Sydney Bruskin, who owned a
bicycle store on Chapel Street, stated:
The Jews wanted to get out… no question about it. They felt it was just a step up, so there
was no thought of it. Friends moved away and you moved away. Economically things got better.
Even if the state had not built the connector, we would have been out of there before long…
Other immigrant groups came in [and] started to occupy it and then there was a certain amount
of friction between some of the ethnic groups… So then people thought, ‘well, we can have a
bigger house and in a neighborhood where more of our friends are.’ 317
While many place their attention on the extensive departure of residents from substandard
and overcrowded housing into contemporary, rat-less dwellings, this was not always the case. A
displaced resident’s relocation relied heavily upon his/her wealth, and those who could afford to
move to the more affluent/expensive suburban towns were few and far between. Instead, many
moved to other areas of the city or were placed into public housing. 318 Certainly, just because
some of those displaced were “freed” from the substandard conditions of the Oak Street
neighborhood and were subsequently able to move into better material living situations, does not
mean that they welcomed or were indifferent towards the blithe destruction of their
community.319 Should one then trust the highly exaggerated denigration/vilification of the Oak
Street neighborhood or rely upon the evocative, nostalgic recollections when attempting to
understand the sentiment of the countless relocated residents?
When Lee was maneuvering to secure the crucial funds for the extension of the
Connector in 1965, the Register had reported that citizens were becoming increasingly concerned
over the city’s plans.320 Dora Moore of Scranton Street, which adjoined Legion Avenue, stated
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that residents wanted to stay where they were and improve their holdings, “but we don’t want to
make investments without knowing what is going to happen to us.”321 This lesson, to Yale
architecture professor Plattus, is that:
Some of the things that make communities good places to live have less to do with the
state of the plumbing and more to do with the relationships that are formed in the community and
the support systems that are formed in the community over a long period of time. Simply picking
people up and moving them to new housing doesn’t make their lives better, and doesn’t make
their opportunities better.322
Although the city established the first Business Relocation Office in the nation, the
businesses within the Oak Street neighborhood were likewise adversely impacted by the city’s
redevelopment program.323 While local agencies were required to aid in family/individual
relocation, that obligation did not apply to businesses – instead, it was merely ‘encouraged.’324
Similarly, reimbursement for commercial moving expenses and property losses, financed in full
by federal grants, was not necessarily guaranteed and frankly insufficient, if compensable at
all.325 Legion Avenue, which had been one of the city’s busiest and most popular commercial
hubs, home to many distinct and venerated small businesses, was torn apart, as one business after
the other were forced to shut down or move away from its clientele. Those spared from
relocation also suffered, but in their case, it was from to the absence of customers. Joseph
Mendillo, who had operated Joe’s Garage, was forced out of the neighborhood in 1967.326
Recalling the dilemma that relocation had placed upon him, he stated, “[They] handed me a
check [and] said it was for the purchase of my property, and that if I didn’t like the figure, I
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would have to take them to court. If I chose to sell to them and stay… I would have had to pay
$700 a month. They gave me no help in relocating.”327
Notably, the businesses of Oak Street/Legion Avenue had been impacted even prior to
the physical redevelopment, as many owners were fiscally ‘strong-armed’ by the city – taxes
were purposely increased and rent was driven up in the area to gradually push them out.328 In
addition, there was the issue of how the city would deal with business owners who were renters,
as many operated as tenants. Although the city had pledged to assist these displaced merchants, it
could not assure commercial relocation, thereby further facilitating the destruction of numerous
long-standing businesses. Morse even mentioned a specific case of a small businessman who had
moved from Oak Street to the Church Street area, only to then face yet another forced relocation
due to that area’s own redevelopment project.329
The Oak Street Project had differing impacts upon the various businesses in the
neighborhood – some suffered greatly, while others (although a much smaller group) were able
to move to a ‘better’ area and subsequently grow and expand. Regardless, most consistently cite
the lack of assistance and support from the city/state in their relocation. Like families, some
businesses had been dislocated directly by the Connector, and as such, under the state highway
program, they were ineligible for assistance, monetary or otherwise.330 Demonstrating the
complexity of this issue, in 1957, Lee even urged the Connecticut State Legislative Committee
on General Law to eliminate this exclusion, as the difference of just a mere block could
determine whether or not one was entitled to assistance. 331
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In all, over 2,000 businesses were eventually displaced by New Haven’s urban renewal
projects.332 Still noteworthy, but more so an indirect impact of redevelopment, is the fact that the
number of grocery stores dramatically decreased – in 1950, 494 had operated within the city, but
just a decade later, half would be closed, and by 1970, only 153 remained (a decline of nearly
seventy percent). Similarly, New Haven’s industrial sector was not revived – between 1947 and
1980, manufacturing jobs continued to decrease by about 20,000, while on the other hand, those
in suburban areas increased fivefold to over 100,000. 333 Thus, the Oak Street Project, as well as
the metamorphic Church Street Project, unquestionably failed to resurrect not only New Haven’s
commercial district, but also its economy.
Redevelopment itself also had profound social effects. While some of New Haven’s Jews
had already begun to emigrate from the Oak Street/Legion Avenue area prior to redevelopment,
this produced a deracination that radically altered the city’s Jewish community. The complete
physical obliteration of the neighborhood and the scattering of its residents caused by the Oak
Street Project, was, to Register reporter Art Horwitz, a modern-day Tower of Babel.334 Dubbed
by Rae, the “Oak Street Diaspora,” it separated neighbor from neighbor, “undercutting many ties
of loyalty and familiarity.”335 Crucially, redevelopment had prompted the relocation of many
New Haven synagogues. These prominent religious centers were more than just places of
worship – they provided a sense of community, familiarity, and a unique connection to the
neighborhood.336 The impact of their destruction was monumental, as almost all of the
synagogues, with the exception of some of the orthodox congregations, were forced to move
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outside the city to the suburbs, soon to be followed by their congregants. 337 Even the New Haven
Jewish Community Center fell victim, not to physical demolition, but to the absence of the city’s
Jewish population, which had long departed. It too eventually relocated into the suburbs.338
The unique sounds and aromas of Oak Street and Legion Avenue, the vitality of the
integrated and cohesive neighborhood, its life, was entirely destroyed. Horwitz wrote, “The lines
of cars have disappeared – as have the parking meters. An eerie silence blankets the once
boisterous air waves… The area where the state has acquired land has become a ghost city.” 339
The widely celebrated delicatessens, synonymous with Legion Avenue and the Oak Street area,
like Fox’s, “with the best corned beef in town,” and M&T’s, boasting “the tastiest lox this side of
Nova Scotia,” both relocated.340 All that remains are the highly-coveted memories and nostalgia
held by its former inhabitants – numerous lucid anecdotes which encapsulate the vibrancy and
ambiance of Saturday nights and Sunday afternoons – what once was New Haven’s version of
Times Square.341 Ticotsky wrote, “If a street can have a distinct character of its own, a flavor, a
color, or a busy bustling tone, Legion Avenue can be said to have possessed all of these
distinguishing qualities.”342
Today, Reunions continue to be held by the ‘Oak Street Alumni’ and entire Facebook
pages have been dedicated to those reminiscing the sacred, exciting, and unique community.343
For many of its residents, most of which were immigrants, their entire existence revolved around
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the now extinct neighborhood – an experience akin to that of an Americanized shtetl, which
provided them the opportunity to pursue the ‘American Dream.’ Not surprisingly, its complete
obliteration was unquestionably lifechanging. Susan Neitlich wrote, “For the Jews, the move
from Oak Street to the outer city and suburbs meant gaining an American identity… [but also]
losing some of the religious, cultural, and social glue that bound them together.”344 Regardless of
its outward condition, to its inhabitants, this neighborhood was home.345
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Despite all of Lee’s efforts, New Haven redevelopment and the Oak Street Project did not
achieve its goals of ‘renewing,’ revitalizing, and restoring the Elm City. While it provided
increased parking availability (although not necessarily where it was needed most) and
eliminated a distinct slum area (by bulldozing it to the ground), it left in its wake the forced
relocation of its inhabitants, the shattering of an established community, and a stagnant, if not
worse, economy. By the time of Lee’s initial election, New Haven had already begun to feel the
impact of suburbanization, not only through the decline of its economy (deindustrialization, a
decamped manufacturing base, and a vegetating downtown commercial district), but also with its
reduction in population. Between 1920 and 1950, New Haven added fewer than 2,000 people,
while three of its surrounding suburbs tripled in size.346 The Oak Street Project only served to
hasten the effects of suburbanization, as the displaced were now compelled to disperse further
and further away from downtown, directly expressing Rae’s concept of “decentering
development,” as people and resources were pushed from the “center to the periphery.” 347
Regarding the underlying ethnic groups, the Jewish community followed their relocated
synagogues and disseminated to previously rural and agriculturally oriented towns, such as
Woodbridge, Orange, Hamden, and suburbanized offshoots within New Haven, particularly up
Whalley Avenue, into Westville. The Italians of the Oak Street neighborhood, other than those
who chose to reside around Wooster Square, similarly moved en masse to East, West, and North
Haven, as well as other suburban coastal towns. The project had completely altered the city’s
social makeup. Overall, New Haven’s population progressively declined from its zenith of
164,443 in 1950, to a present total of around 130,000 (even including Yale students) – an
ironically identical figure to the population of the city at the time of Gilbert and Olmstead’s
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projection.348 From 1920 to 1990, New Haven’s percent loss in population was -19.7% and was
the only town in the Greater New Haven Area to have population decline besides Orange (who
only technically sustained its loss due to the subtraction of its more densely settled eastern part
which was absorbed by the incorporation of West Haven in 1921).349 This also stands in stark
contrast to six other towns situated within New Haven County which grew tenfold or more
during this same period.350
In examining these statistics, Rae finds the astonishing growth of two categorical groups
to be even more revealing. First, was the “high-income bedroom communities,” such as
Guilford, Madison, Cheshire, and Woodbridge, towns that have since become enclaves for
relatively affluent business/professionals who enjoy the structural changes in taxation, education,
and real estate appreciation. 351 These though, were not simply ‘bedroom communities,’ as the
residents, a number of which were ‘urban emigrants,’ not only slept in these suburbs, but also
increasingly made and spent their money there as well – a significant issue that Lee had
strenuously sought to overcome.352 The second was the inner-ring suburbs of Hamden, West
Haven, and East Haven, that have evolved into mostly heterogeneous communities, which
together, have grown to a size comparable to New Haven. 353
To Rae, this evident outward flow of private capital thoroughly displays the full effects of
New Haven’s suburbanization movement. 354 The ‘equalized grand list,’ which is balanced to
account for the impact of varied assessment practices and frequencies of revaluation, placed New
Haven at the very bottom of the regional hierarchy in 1996, with just $35,043 per capita – a

348

Rae, City, 233.
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 88.
350
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 88.
351
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 88.
352
Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, 136.
353
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 88.
354
Rae, Maynard and Noyes eds, Carriages and Clocks, Corsets and Locks, 89.
349

73
figure “trebled by six towns, doubled by eight more, and exceeded by all.” 355 Further, the
percentage of New Haven’s population living below the poverty level in 2000 was a striking
24.4%, compared to the Connecticut average of just under 8%.356 Other than Meriden, all towns
within the Greater New Haven Area possessed poverty level figures of less than ten percent
below the poverty level, including nine of less than five percent. 357 Although much of Yale is
excluded from the ‘equalized grand list’ (in 1957, the assessed value of its tax-exempt property
was $71 million – today it is an astonishing $4.3 billion), these statistics nevertheless convey the
impact of suburbanization and the socioeconomic transformation of New Haven, which, since
the implementation of redevelopment and the catastrophe that was the Oak Street Project, has
suffered not only the loss of residents, but also substantial economic decline and increased
poverty.358
On a broader, harsher scale, it is difficult to discern whether New Haven’s redevelopment
program was propagated by implicit racial motivations. Although the total number of whites
relocated due to the city’s urban renewal projects was greater than that of non-whites, at about
fifty-six percent, Rae acknowledges that this may mask the true racial impact, as non-whites
constituted only fifteen percent of New Haven’s population.359 This therefore suggests that “any
one family of color had a far greater chance of being relocated than any single white family,” as
the smaller representation of non-whites, particularly African Americans, made them 4.5 times
more likely to be displaced.360 Moreover, families of color were placed into public housing three
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times as frequently as whites (29.5% to 8.1%), while inversely, whites were purchasing homes in
the city, as well as outside of it, at far greater rates.361 Nationally, nearly two-thirds of residents
displaced by urban renewal projects were non-white, leading some to nickname the program
‘Negro removal.’362
However, with respect to the Oak Street Project, it is difficult to claim that it was entirely
motivated by race or predicated upon the removal of non-whites, as the neighborhood itself
consisted mostly of Jews and Italians – at the time, African Americans and other non-whites only
comprised a minor, yet increasing percentage of the population. Wolfinger though, claimed that
by the 1950’s, the area was “half black.”363 Nonetheless, its residents were still considered ethnic
minorities and certainly not the upper-class WASPs Lee wished to attract. Looking deeper into
the theoretical underpinnings behind the Oak Street Connector, it is clear that it was conceived as
more than just simply transporting people and business (and wealth) back into the city. It was
designed as an attack on poverty, and in turn, focused purposely on eliminating a densely
populated, lower-income, working-class community – the excision of New Haven’s ‘cancerous
tumor.’ As Rae notes, the gratuitously ample width of the project “says a great deal about its
implicit purpose.”364
Despite this though, questions still remain. An analysis of pre-redevelopment New Haven
maps – two maps by Benedict Gropp, depicting ‘Negro New Haven’ and the African American
activity throughout the city, may actually reveal a shade of subverted racism within the
project.365 Both of these illustrate a significant portion of ‘Negro’ life in New Haven, including
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areas of African-American residence and the site of three African-American churches – all of
which were situated in or around the exact area that would succumb to the construction of the
Oak Street Connector.366 Additionally, the Hill neighborhood, which was to be directly separated
from downtown by the Connector, was a particular area that had had been increasingly attracting
non-white inhabitation.367 Later, after much of the city’s urban renewal projects had left behind
“substandard housing, fewer jobs, older schools and a concentration of poor blacks who had yet
to establish a strong political base,” this neighborhood became predominately African-American
and, in 1967, would erupt in intense violence – the city’s notorious ‘1967 Riot.’368

Given this, one might also wonder if the substantial rise in the construction of government
subsidized housing in New Haven, as promulgated through the Oak Street Project and in
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combination with HOLC ‘redlining,’ was actually a device used by the city as a means to
segregate its non-white inhabitants. Yet, when examining the role of race, it is important to
understand that despite this perception, Lee had been very progressive for his time, actively
liberal on racial issues long before the Civil Rights Movement and, according to Wolfinger,
“took a strong line against prejudice in redevelopment housing.” 369
Carley asserts that hundreds of millions had been committed to redevelopment and new
construction in New Haven, but instead of relieving the ever-pervasive issue of poverty, it
resulted in the “deepening entrenchment of ghetto conditions, and the related disenfranchisement
of minorities who were segregated into the inner city as whites left for the suburbs.” 370 The white
populations displaced by the Oak Street Project, as well as New Haven’s other redevelopment
endeavors, may have had some difficulty (depending on wealth) in finding new housing and
commercial sites, but for non-whites this was almost impossible. Mermin wrote that his
predecessor had stated upon resignation, “This job is impossible. There is more prejudice here up
North than there is in the South – only here it is often more subtle… all you hear is ‘no children,
no pets, and white only’ – so how is it possible to find a place for Negro families too large for
public housing and unwanted by private landlords?”371
Suburbanization and drastic shifts in demographics were also accelerated by New
Haven’s redevelopment projects, a trend which Rae views as ‘white removal,’ noting the
precipitous loss of the city’s white population post-urban renewal.372 The number of New
Haven’s white inhabitants markedly declined from over 150,000 at the time of Lee’s election, to
under 100,00 when he left his post as mayor, and then to around 50,000 by the start of the
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twenty-first century.373 On the other hand, over this same period of time, the percentage of racial
minorities within the city dramatically shifted upwards from just 9.6% to 56.5%.374
Correspondingly, only five census tracts added white residents (all of which were not situated
downtown, but instead, in areas considered “in-town suburbs”), compared to over twenty tracts
which encountered a significant subtraction. 375
Certainly, a more sociological outlook regarding this transformation would involve an
assessment of the sentiments of whites toward the increasing non-white population. Rae though,
contends that this is not the direct effect of New Haven’s urban renewal and highway
construction programs, since the physical racial movement, commonly known as the ‘white
flight,’ the large-scale departure of whites from urban environments to the suburbs in response to
the migration of minorities, had actually begun several decades prior to Lee’s election.376
However, when analyzing the Oak Street neighborhood, it should be noted that this exodus was
generally a more gradual development for the Jewish populations of New Haven, as many would
relocate away from downtown, but stay within the city limits, only to later fully depart for the
suburbs.377 Instead, in Rae’s view, it could be argued that the visibility of urban renewal and its
“certification of working-class neighborhoods as slums” may have effectively encouraged their
departure.378 Another explanation for this ‘white’ suburbanization rests in the rise of the
automobile, and with it, the vast expansion of highways, which made it easier for individuals to
move into “relatively distant suburbs” and still work in the city. 379 In Shopping for Schools, Jack
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Dougherty also incorporates the motivation and appeal of superior public suburban schooling as
another viable reason for suburbanization and the concurrent population shifts.380
Still, it must be noted that during Lee’s tenure, the City of New Haven actually
experienced its most rapid growth of non-white populations.381 In 1950, the New Haven
Statistical Metropolitan Area, which included Branford, East Haven, Hamden, North Haven,
Orange, West Haven, Woodbridge, and New Haven, contained just 10,640 black residents – by
1970, this figure swelled to 41,337, a 289% increase. 382 While an astounding shift in
demographics, this was the common experience of many northern cities during the post-World
War Two era, as many minorities migrated to urban centers in search of manufacturing jobs.383
Tianna Terry notes that this upsurge may also correlate with the city’s increase in the availability
of public housing as a result of its redevelopment projects. New Haven public housing had
“transformed from a temporary residence for working families into… a long-term stay for people
of color living beneath the lower-edge of the mainstream economy.”384
When attempting to fully understand the Oak Street Project, it is vital to examine the role
played by Yale, perhaps the city’s most significant and prominent socioeconomic feature – in
1974, it was New Haven’s second largest employer and tenth biggest taxpayer, despite the ‘taxexempt’ status of most of its holdings.385 Although Yale did not initiate New Haven’s
redevelopment efforts itself, it undoubtedly benefitted, particularly with regards to the Oak Street
Project. Not surprisingly, the University “ended up being one of the leading beneficiaries in the
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whole country” from the results of urban renewal.”386 It is certainly worth noting that Rotival and
Logue, two of the most influential minds that directly shaped New Haven’s redevelopment plans,
had been linked to Yale, as both a professor and graduate, respectively. Similarly, Lee’s close
association, which included his friendship with Griswold, could also have been a considerable
factor in the advantageousness of redevelopment for the University, although he apparently
“leaned over backward” to avoid public scrutiny and dispel suspicions of favoritism.387
Despite this, what remains unquestioned is that out of the rubble upon which Oak Street
once stood, Yale was able to substantially expand its own infrastructure, including building a
multi-million-dollar Laboratory of Epidemiology and Public Health.388 The city’s former
Economic Development Administrator, Matthew Nemerson, believes that “At a local and
national level, [redevelopment] was engineered by Yale for the purpose of cleaning up New
Haven for their campus.”389 Even now, much of the flattened remains of Legion Avenue are used
as parking for Yale-New Haven Hospital. Dickinson could not avoid the glaring disparity in
aesthetic appearance, pointing out that, “Given the Yale campus’ parade of architectural
virtuosity and the elegant power and provenance of the New Haven Green… this clutter of
construction oozing down a failed vision’s aftermath feels all the more disappointing.”390 In fact,
according to Lizabeth Cohen, the project had allowed Yale to architecturally improve – “It
abandoned traditional collegiate Gothic for modern buildings that broadcast Yale’s embrace of
the future, which included a greater commitment to the sciences.”391 While Yale had been a
premier institution for centuries, this exponential physical, as well as social expansion, caused in
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part by the Oak Street Project, led to its total transformation, as the University grew from a
bastion of WASP privilege into an establishment based upon meritocracy and
academic/scientific excellence.392
While Oak Street/Legion Avenue was just one of New Haven’s many neighborhoods, the
destruction of its active community, combined with the forced relocation of its inhabitants and
businesses withdrew from the vitality and outward attraction of the city as a whole. Although
redevelopment sought to remove blighted areas and replace them with more modern, improved,
and appealing structures, the question remains as to why city planners believed that suburban
residents would then choose to move to downtown New Haven after having observed the city’s
enthusiastic and indifferent uprooting and disposal of its former longtime inhabitants? What did
they believe these people would actually think when they witnessed the destruction of these
neighborhoods, only to be replaced with bland, sterile apartment complexes and unattractive,
‘modernistic’ buildings? Additionally, why would these individuals choose to come into New
Haven to shop downtown if they could do the same in more accessible suburban commercial
districts? Thus, even if the Oak Street Connector had been fully and successfully completed,
connecting downtown to an extended Route 34, there is no basis for a belief that it would have
changed the attitudes of suburbanites. The notions believed by the ‘experts’ of urban renewal,
specifically that they could create the desire in suburban populations to live and shop in
downtown New Haven simply through the construction of a massive thoroughfare, was nothing
more than an illusory pipe dream – the impact of which was terribly profound.
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CHAPTER IV: THE LESSONS AND LEGACY OF OAK STREET
“As the history of New Haven’s renewal reveals, there are no simple and sure answers to
saving cities, and even with all the government aid, many negative circumstances must be
reckoned with.”393
“The federal urban renewal program conceived in 1949 had admirable goals.
Unfortunately, it has not and cannot achieve them. Only free enterprise can.” 394
The impact of the Oak Street Project upon New Haven was sudden and significant.
Besides relocation, destruction, and overall failure, it produced a shift in the focus of the city’s
urban renewal program away from radical, comprehensive clearance towards selective,
piecemeal redevelopment, residential rehabilitation, and affordable housing financed through
federal programs.395 The effects of this alteration would most visibly emerge through the
Wooster Square Project. According to Talbot, Interstate-91, as originally conceived by state
highway engineers, would stretch into New Haven directly through the Wooster Square
neighborhood, thereby destroying much of the area, including hundreds of homes and
businesses.396 In 1951, under the Celentano administration, the city had presented the planners
with information that a realignment of the intended route would be less expensive and avoid any
substantial damage. 397 The state however, rejected this proposal.398
This resistance would only triumph later, after the construction of the Connector had
destroyed the Oak Street neighborhood and displayed the disheartening physical and emotional
trauma produced by such an intense transformation. When the repositioning of the highway
commenced, I-91 was instead purposely placed so as to save the heart of Wooster Square and
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avert as much destruction as possible, even functioning as a buffer between rehabilitated housing
structures and the cleared industrial section, allowing the latter to eventually attract millions in
new private investment.399 Although many residents and businesses were still displaced, unlike
Oak Street, this project did not eliminate the community – to this day, Wooster Square remains a
cohesive Italian enclave.
Another glaring difference was the fact that Wooster Square, while also targeted for a
potential redevelopment project, was instead primarily focused on rehabilitation, the physical
improvement and conservation of housing, rather than straightforward demolition. An advisory
committee appointed by President Eisenhower had reported that cities attempting to tear down
slums were “finding themselves on a treadmill,” as new slums were being created faster than old
ones could be cleared.400 In addition, while Title I of the 1949 Housing Act had only provided
government assistance for redevelopment through clearance and demolition, its expansion in
1954 allowed for federal aid in projects which specifically included the rehabilitation of existing
structures.401 Given this, the question arises as to why the city chose not to utilize this legislative
amendment with regards to the Oak Street Project. Were the conditions of the Oak Street
neighborhood that much worse than those of Wooster Square, or for that matter any other
community in New Haven? If so, did this then merely come down to a bureaucratic decision over
which slums to eliminate? Such questions only add more substance to the claim that the
construction of the Connector served more than just the purpose of facilitating transportation.
Nonetheless, it is patently clear that the combination of the grim nature of the Oak Street
Project’s total destruction and its resultant architectural sterility produced a substantial shift in
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the city’s redevelopment ideologies, enabling it to encompass new and different urban renewal
techniques, such as: the restoration of established structures (both housing and commercial),
minimal spot clearance, the construction of new schools and community facilities, and the
addition of parks and open, communal spaces.402 This was to be actual ‘renewal’ – restoring an
old neighborhood rather than building a new one. 403 Now, public spending would be used to
judiciously clear blight and finance modern amenities, thereby enhancing the area’s desirability,
stimulating private investment, increasing property values, and, importantly, restoring property
owners faith in the future of their neighborhood.404 Wooster Square Project director, Mary
Hommann, explained that for this endeavor the goal was to “maintain the residential character of
the neighborhood [and] to achieve as much architectural relevance to the original design of each
house as could possibly be achieved,” as opposed to the previous obsession of renewal through
clearance.405 Consequently, while the Wooster Square Project would become the site of the
largest total number of building demolitions in New Haven’s redevelopment history, it was also
the city’s inaugural location for federally funded rehabilitation – even one of the first in the
entire nation.406
In an attempt to convince homeowners to rehabilitate, the RA purchased various Wooster
Square structures from those who preferred to sell and used them to demonstrate what it
expected – the acquired houses were sandblasted, retrimmed, gutted inside, and converted into
apartment townhouses. 407 Along with this, a city planning team, in association with the RA,
visited houses and “using the Housing Code as a weapon and persuasion as a device,” employing
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the ‘carrot-and-stick;’ they successfully to convinced (or coerced) numerous owners to not just
improve their buildings to the strict code standards, but also to aesthetically enhance them as
well.408 Similarly, while local banks had been reluctant to lend money for housing improvements
in the Oak Street and Wooster Square neighborhoods, as they were both designated by the
HOLC as ‘red’ areas, to help back rehabilitation efforts the RA lobbied and pushed for increased
financing for the latter.409 The RA even went so far as to publish a pamphlet which explained to
Wooster Square residents how they could be assisted in financing home improvements, including
what types of loans were available, where they could be obtained, how much could be borrowed,
how long they would have to repay, and how to protect themselves in credit dealings. 410
It is therefore plausible that the visible destruction of the Oak Street neighborhood and
the fear of the power of eminent domain played a major role in the willingness of Wooster
Square residents to invest in their community and adhere to the city’s rehabilitative renewal plan.
In addition, Hommann addressed the city’s tactics in ‘aggressively’ persuading residents to
privately fund the rehabilitation of Wooster Square, what Lowe labeled the “lead them by the
hand approach,” stating, “The [housing] code is enforceable through the courts, where
punishment can consist of both fine and imprisonment… [and] the agency can purchase such
properties through eminent domain.”411 As Hommann declared, “We carry a big stick – in fact,
two big sticks.”412 Robert J. Leeney and Lowe both point to another possible explanation for the
inclination to remodel and repair, namely a tragic 1957 fire in an old neighborhood dress factory
which killed fifteen people, thereby thoroughly displaying the dangers of urban decay to the
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entire community.413 In all, by 1968, Lee claimed that about 9,000 dwellings, “about $17 million
worth of housing,” had been privately rehabilitated. 414
Whereas the Oak Street Project had shown that comprehensive renewal – the total
destruction and wholesale clearance of areas – was not successful, Wooster Square conversely
demonstrated that piecemeal demolition and selective rehabilitation were more likely to succeed
in actually ‘renewing’ areas that were considered blighted. In accordance with this notion,
former New Haven Mayor John DeStefano metaphorically stated that the best approach to
redevelopment was “more gardening… pulling some weeds and putting in new plants… where
you retain some strong sense of ownership of the neighborhood.”415 This concept was fully
embodied in Wooster Square, where the Lee, Logue, and the RA saw a fresh opportunity to
prove that it was possible to cut away pockets of slums and replace them with new life – “that we
could rebuild a neighborhood with a scalpel [instead of] a bulldozer.”416 As such, it was through
this project that Logue, who left New Haven in 1961 for another urban renewal venture in
Boston, felt that he “really learned to do the urban renewal business right.”417
What separates straightforward demolition from rehabilitation and preservation is that,
for the most part, it avoids the displacement and the subsequent mass relocation of residents – it
can keep the identity of the community intact. Also, such action is most likely less expensive and
less disruptive upon the fabric of the urban environment, while eschewing the issues of securing
private development and the heavy reliance on federal funding. Although the Wooster Square
Project involved substantial relocation and destruction (both in larger numbers than Oak Street),
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its neighborhood, albeit unquestionably transformed from its pre-redevelopment appearance,
continues to exist as ‘Little Italy,’ the hub of New Haven Italian culture and the location of some
of America’s finest pizza establishments.
However, as with Oak Street, one must address the looming question of the existence of
an underlying racial motive. While the Wooster Square Project preserved an ethnic community,
it also involved the removal of non-Italians, and specifically, non-whites. Where clearance was
to be undertaken, the city expressed the intent to build housing projects. But in response, the
residents of Wooster Square argued for low-rise, single-family homes, as opposed to high-rise
apartments or low-rent public housing.418 To Lowe, this stance not only reflected a dislike of the
public landlord, but also the “antagonism of the Italians to the low-income, lower-status Negro
families” who would most likely inhabit these structures.419
Nonetheless, Talbot asserted in 1967, that Wooster Square was perhaps one of the
nation’s most successful renewal endeavors, writing:
The unsightly mixture of industrial, commercial, and residential land uses has been
unscrambled. Once ugly and declining retail strips have been fixed up and revived. Different
kinds of new housing for the elderly and for families of upper, middle, and moderate income
have given the neighborhood the variety that city life is supposed to give. New Haven has shown
that an old and declining city neighborhood can be restored.420
Lowe also claimed that Wooster Square seemed to have been “virtually what the authors
of the 1954 Housing Act had in mind,” as the project “became a model of how to keep a oncefine neighborhood from becoming a slum and give it new life.”421
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This success though, was greatly contingent upon the disposition of the property-owning
residents – the requirement that they ‘buy in’ and voluntarily follow the encouragement and
guidance of redevelopment officials – initiating ‘renewal’ themselves, and crucially, not
abandoning the area. Despite this, procuring the rehabilitation of a neighborhood is not
guaranteed and a major uncertainty. Not surprisingly, part of its unreliability stems from the need
for banks to finance projects in areas they would not normally, as well as the systematic
enforcement of housing code standards. 422
Based upon her assessment of the results of the Wooster Square Project, Lowe wrote that
for rehabilitation to work on a meaningful scale, “it seems that the city government must supply
the extra imagination, enterprise, and enthusiasm.”423 Similarly, to Anderson, the implementation
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of a rehabilitative redevelopment project would only be applicable if the housing in question was
“not bad enough to justify tearing it down and not good enough to measure up to certain
standards.”424 This, of course, is dependent upon the definition of these often vague/ambiguous
‘standards.’ Writing in 1964 (almost in the middle of the urban renewal movement), Anderson
deemed that the early results of federally assisted rehabilitation were not encouraging and that it
was simply just as unproductive as clearance, as at the time, the number of substandard homes
nationally lagged behind the rate of those repaired and continued to rely too much on
considerable amounts of private initiation and public financing, thereby further questioning its
large-scale economic feasibility. 425
Regardless of the effectiveness of rehabilitation in improving ‘slum-like’ living
conditions, reviving an economy, or thwarting suburban sprawl, it is obvious that such a form of
redevelopment was more preferable than wholesale demolition, which left many in search of new
housing and created a swath of vacant urban land that, in New Haven’s case, lacked the required
demand from private enterprise.426 If the City of New Haven had employed this less destructive,
conservation-focused approach to the renewal of the Oak Street neighborhood, is it plausible that
it would still exist as a lively, integrated, ethnic enclave? Maybe not. But such speculation is
moot and inconsequential – it is simply impossible to know given Lee and the city’s “vaporizing
of a neighborhood in advance of its assumed inevitability.” 427
When analyzing the significance of the Oak Street Project, it is important to contextualize
it on a national scale. Urban renewal was implemented in hundreds of cities across the country,
each with distinct projects and objectives, and all with varying impacts and results. As Wolfinger
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noted, one of its most important features was its protean quality – its flexibility as a means for
cities to rearrange the physical environment, and therefore the pattern of life within it. 428
Although it had widespread ramifications, one must be wary to view the Oak Street Project as a
case study for all of redevelopment. However, throughout the history of urban renewal, there
have been many analogous instances of ‘slum clearance’ across the nation, thus exhibiting that
the belief in the ability of comprehensive demolition to ‘renew’ a city was not merely confined to
New Haven. The destructive use of bulldozers and wrecking balls, along with the invasive
construction of highways and the addition of ‘modern’ buildings, obliterated countless
communities, exiled their residents to unfamiliar areas, struggled to revitalize and revamp the
idea of the ‘city,’ and radically transformed the social character and physical appearance of the
urban landscape.
An eerily similar redevelopment project occurred in Boston, where the city razed the
entire ‘West End,’ a small, diverse (largely Irish, Italian, and Jewish) neighborhood along the
Charles River, just north of Beacon Hill and west of Downtown Boston.429 The district, like Oat
Street, was an ‘urban village’ that comprised some of the city’s poorer working-class residents
and was superficially condemned as a ‘slum’ by outsiders (although many have thoroughly
argued against this claim).430 In 1953, Mayor John Hynes officially announced a plan for renewal
of the neighborhood, citing its narrow streets and substandard housing, of which approximately
eighty percent were deemed not up to code. 431 Commencing in 1958, the project involved the
complete clearance of 48 acres of the West End, displacing 2,700 families and making way for
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several ‘luxury’ residential high rise apartment complexes and several arterial highways.432 The
West End neighborhood, home to several thousand Bostonians, was completely demolished – its
residents were deracinated and left stranded. Citing the project’s net cost of $15.8 million,
Anderson calculated that the tax revenue from the reconstruction of the West End would not
break even until 2000.433
While the original structures were outwardly deteriorated and substandard, to Herbert
Gans, they served the important purpose of providing inexpensive private housing that satisfied
their low-income residents.434 Further, just as occurred in Oak Street, their replacement – the
newly constructed ‘luxury’ apartment complexes – were never meant to rehouse the
neighborhood’s former residents.435 “To this day, there are virtually no businesses in the new
West End, other than a few medical offices. Rather than a destination, the new West End feels
more like an oasis… a very quiet, largely ignored section of Boston.”436 Cohen writes that the
effects of the West End Project would “reverberate locally and nationally as a symbol of urban
renewal’s destructive and hubristic approach in the fifties.” 437 This is merely one story –
hundreds of destructive renewal undertakings would envelope whole neighborhoods, irrevocably
transforming each metropolis in which it was employed.
Robert Moses, known as one of the greatest and most powerful redevelopment figures in
American history, had conceived and produced billions of dollars-worth of construction
throughout much of New York City. Shaping it to his vision, New York became “the most

Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, 170; Gans, The Urban Villagers; Boston Streetcars, “The West End’s
Transformation.”
433
Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, 170-171.
434
Gans, The Urban Villagers; Lowe, Cities in a Race with Time, 209.
435
Cohen, Saving America’s Cities, 117; Anna Boyles, “The Demolition of the West End,” City of Boston, March
27, 2020.
436
Boston Streetcars, “The West End’s Transformation.”
437
Cohen, Saving America’s Cities, 159.
432

91
controversial, civically-disliked, scandal-tainted program in the country.”438 According to Lowe,
Moses’ approach was ill-advised, “tearing down slums in project areas and crowding displaced
people into new slums.”439 His work though, which focused on clearance and demolition,
attracted extensive and expensive private development (particularly in Manhattan), built bridges,
parks, and “endless rows of banal apartment towers.”440 Tens of thousands of people and
businesses (most of which were poor) were coldly dislocated, only to be sloppily relocated,
ultimately rupturing the fabric of the city.441 Still, as Cohen writes, “Moses did not only bulldoze
neighborhoods and build insensitively; he constructed crucially needed infrastructure.” 442
Prior to New Haven and the passage of Title I, the smog shrouded industrial giant of
Pittsburgh stood out to many as an image of hope for urban renewal, as it had exhibited striking
visible changes to the physical landscape, ultimately creating the “postcard vision” and
“architectural renaissance” of a ‘New Pittsburgh.’443 With the assistance of the Mellon family,
the financial kingpin of the city, Pittsburgh became a pioneer for comprehensive redevelopment,
extensively tearing down and building anew, directly confronting blighted, substandard, and
overcrowded urban areas with blank indifference.444 To Lowe, it existed as “the most palpable
example of the devastation wrought on… by rapid industrialization which disregarded human
life, community welfare or urban amenity.”445 This included one of the city’s largest projects and
one of the “saddest chapters in the history of American cities.”446 In the 1950’s, Allegheny
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Center was ‘redeveloped’ and obliterated, along with the razing of hundreds of buildings.447 The
area has been desolate for decades, only slowly being revived in the past few years. 448 Still,
although it displaced thousands of residents, renewal did have some positive effects for
Pittsburgh, making it a “better, cleaner, and more productive city.”449
Southwest Washington D.C., one of the worst slums in the country, was home to an
immense, low-income, and predominately African American community.450 Through a twentyyear redevelopment project, it was entirely demolished to make way for modernist buildings,
townhouses, high-rise apartments, and condominiums to accommodate wealthy white residents,
as well as the construction of Interstate-395.451 In all, it displaced an estimated 1,500 businesses,
23,000 residents, and 6,000 families, fully embodying the notion of ‘negro removal,’ as 4,500
African American families were uprooted and forced to relocate to other areas. 452 As Lowe
stated, by 1965, only 11.9% of tenants in the area’s private housing were African American, as
opposed to an astonishing 95% in public housing.453 Its consequences for the urban renewal
movement also spread nationwide, as it led to the United States Supreme Court case of Berman
v. Parker (1954), which upheld the legality of the public seizure of ‘slum property’ through
eminent domain for subsequent private development of the land. 454
Much of Detroit’s inner city was also old and decaying, and in an ‘attempt’ to remove the
pervasive blight, the city executed an intense program of renewal, clearing historical
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neighborhoods, displacing thousands of African Americans, and isolating predominately
minority areas through the construction of highways which functioned as barriers of racial
segregation.455 This included the city’s ‘8-Mile Road,’ a freeway that symbolically, yet quite
literally, separated the more affluent white suburbs from the poorer, non-white area of central
Detroit.456 According to Thomas Sugrue, the city had “no adequate relocation plans for residents
uprooted by urban renewal,” as city officials “expected most households to find new dwellings
without any government assistance.”457 Whereas prior to redevelopment, Detroit had been one of
the nation’s fastest growing boomtowns, as Thomas Sugrue writes, “Today, the city is plagued
by joblessness, concentrated poverty, physical decay, and racial isolation… [it] has lost nearly a
million people and hundreds of thousands of jobs. Vast areas of the city, once teeming with life,
now stand abandoned… Whole sections are eerily apocalyptic.”458 Detroit’s urban renewal only
created urban crisis.
While each of these were unique projects, they are just a few of the many redevelopment
programs implemented by cities across the nation, demonstrating not only the tremendous
physical, social, and economic ramifications of urban renewal and slum clearance as a whole, but
also conveying the reality that the Oak Street Project was not a singular event and did not exist
within a vacuum. The notion held by city planners that revitalization coincided with demolition
and reconstruction was not confined to a singular neighborhood in New Haven, but rather, was a
common urban experience. Further, the former inhabitants of Oak Street were just a few
thousand of the millions who had been forcibly removed from their surroundings, either to be
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insensibly kicked to the curb, herded into disobliging public housing projects, or driven into
other deplorable areas of urban life, all for the sake of highway construction and expensive
private development – the idealistic belief that it would bring back into the city the people that it
wanted in its confines. While a few projects did produce some positive results, the Oak Street
Project stands as a symbol of the failures, the hazards, and the intense undoing of redevelopment.
By and large, the federal urban renewal program, which provided cities with a license to
discretionally tear themselves apart, casually eviscerating whole neighborhoods, had simply
created urban wreckage.
***
Around the time of Lee’s departure from City Hall, many had already begun to critique
and condemn the urban renewal movement. While some writers, such as Dahl, Talbot, and
Powledge had focused specifically on its implementation in New Haven, and others like
Anderson examined its effects nationally (who himself had deliberately argued for the repeal of
the urban renewal program), one cannot attempt to appreciate the extensive historiography of
redevelopment without briefly discussing Jane Jacobs.
A writer and activist, Jacobs was arguably the most prominent opponent of urban
renewal. Unreservedly denouncing the movement for its disruptive impact on people,
neighborhoods, and urban life, she defended the commonly targeted mixed-use neighborhoods
and called for community-oriented ‘renewal’ programs. Her treatise, The Death and Life of
Great American Cities, and her involvement in challenging Moses’ plans for ‘slum clearance’ in
New York helped to prevent invasive redevelopment projects and transform the field of city
planning. Regarding her activism, Jacobs personally led grass-roots resistance efforts against the
construction of highways and high-rises, particularly within her Greenwich Village, where an

95
extension of Fifth Avenue cutting directly through Washington Square Park was intended to be
built.459 She succeeded, saving the park and closing it off to all automobile traffic, effectively
defeating Moses.460 In his book Wrestling with Moses, author Anthony Flint details Jacobs’
battles with the New York redeveloper, writing, “Moses had come into her neighborhood and
been turned back.”461 Later, Jacobs would also thwart Moses’ proposed Lower Manhattan
Expressway.462 In the end, her crusade against New York redevelopment resulted in the end of
the ‘Moses Era,’ as large-scale
projects “would never again succeed
without public scrutiny and consent…
[Moses’] brand of megaproject, with
no mechanism or regard for citizen
approval, was rendered obsolete.”463
This was not limited to New York, as
these actions inspired a series of
citizen rebellions against
redevelopment projects across the nation.
The Death and Life of Great American Cities, perhaps the most well-known and
influential critique of “top-down” urban renewal, exists as a direct attack upon the destructive
ideas implemented by city planners – the “wistful myth” that urban decay and the proliferation of
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slums could be reversed with “enough money.”464 To Jacobs, the evidence of its ineffectiveness
and overall negative impact was clear, as she wrote:
Look what we have built… Low-income projects that become worse centers of
delinquency, vandalism, and general social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to
replace. Middle-income housing projects which are truly marvels of dullness and regimentation,
sealed against any buoyancy or vitality of city life. Luxury housing projects that mitigate their
inanity, or try to, with a vapid vulgarity…. Promenades that go from no place to nowhere and
have no promenaders. Expressways that eviscerate great cities. This is not the rebuilding of
cities. This is the sacking of cities.465
Jacobs believed that sidewalks and parks functioned within cities as a mechanism for
creating and maintaining a community, and in particular, the human social aspect of diverse
neighborhoods.466 Cities themselves were vast ecosystems of valuable spontaneity and vitality
which should be allowed to develop organically. She considered that these were improperly
labeled as ‘slums’ – areas that were overlooked, marginalized, and vilified by the planners who
sought to eliminate them.467 To her, the ideal version of an urban neighborhood was instead a
dense, small “island, turned inward on itself.” 468 Instead of separating and dividing cites with
massive infrastructure and slicing roads, she argued that the neighborhoods should be mixed-use,
consisting of residential, commercial, cultural, and industrial activity, and the scaling up of the
physical urban environment. Renewal planning was itself the harm, producing severe
devastation.469 In all, by exposing the ‘unplanning’ of redevelopment and ‘slum’ clearance, Jane
Jacobs played a crucial, indispensable role in the ‘turning the tide’ against comprehensive urban
renewal projects.
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CONCLUSION: RENEWAL TO WRECKAGE
“As in the pseudoscience of bloodletting, just so in the pseudoscience of city rebuilding and
planning, years of learning and a plethora of subtle and complicated dogma have arisen on a
foundation of nonsense.” 470 – Jane Jacobs
In the early 1950’s, redevelopment was relatively untried and an unknown. Over the
following decades it would become enormously popular, even commonplace. Seen as the answer
to postwar urban decay, it was employed in dramatic fashion. By 1965, this involved the
participation of nearly eight hundred cities, the acquisition of nearly fifty-seven square miles,
and the demolition of over 150,000 structures. 471 When new federal funding for the urban
renewal program ended in 1974, over 2,100 projects had been initiated nationwide, with grants
totaling approximately $53 billion (in 2009 dollars, adjusted for inflation).472 New Haven, a
relatively diminutive city, fully embraced redevelopment and implemented one of the largest
programs in the entire nation. Upon the termination of Richard C. Lee’s sixteen-year mayoralty,
the process had affected one-third of New Haven’s total land area – approximately 2,400 acres –
and one-half of its population.473 Around a fifth of the city’s population was forced to move. 474
During just the 1960’s, New Haven’s most active decade of destruction, roughly one out of every
six dwelling units were eliminated. 475 Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on acquisition,
relocation, demolition, public construction, and private development. Tens of thousands were
displaced and forced to move. Ineffectual and beyond costly, the city retained it plaguing
problems and plunged further downhill, now existing as a ‘model city’ for poverty and blight.
Redevelopment had destroyed an entire neighborhood and completely transformed New Haven.
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Looking back, Lee never fulfilled his dream of molding New Haven into a slumless city.
Instead, the city’s redevelopment “collapsed under the weight of its several large order
miscalculations,” with the Oak Street Project in particular failing to accomplish most of its
objectives.476 When analyzing Lee and New Haven redevelopment, it is imperative to understand
that despite this failure, at the time it was considered to be the path to urban revival. As Rae
writes, “Lee’s vision was remarkable but less than clairvoyant: he failed to anticipate the
changing economic functions of urban space… the future of retail markets, [and] failed to fully
understand that the centered city of old could not be restored by bricks and mortar.”477
When Lee and Logue began to consider the implementation of redevelopment, they were
driven by the belief that the removal and relocation of families and businesses from ‘slum
hovels’ to better areas was a sufficient moral justification for the drastic public action in the form
of total clearance and relocation. 478 Further, to city planners like Logue, it was their mandate to
“save [their] blighted cities from themselves” through the wholesale demolition of slums, yet in
effect, they “inflicted scorched-earth ‘renewal’ upon a neighborhood” and displayed the
cataclysmic effects of total land clearance to the nation.479 New Haven’s comprehensive razing
of communities was illogical and perfunctory, merely representing the fallacy “that if you got rid
of low-quality housing full of poor people, something good would happen in its place.”480 As a
result of the city’s urban renewal endeavors, “walls of concrete highways separated
neighborhoods [and] disrupted communities,” producing a “built space that was thoughtless and
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largely unconnected to how people lived their lives, at work, in their homes and in their
neighborhoods.”481
Lee had tremendously miscalculated what redevelopment, specifically how it was
employed in Oak Street, could achieve. In reality, the built environment could not be
transformed in its entirety with any amount of funding, and even the most complete
transformation of the area could not convincingly renew the city, as an improved physical
environment could not make up for the “traumatic sense of loss imposed by demolition and
relocation.482 Describing New Haven’s urban renewal initiative, author Vincent Scully similarly
finds that its effects were utterly devastating to both the city and its communities, emphatically
pointing out that “Modernist planning was cataclysmic, almost wholly destructive. It was
contemptuous of the traditional fabric of cities and was out to obliterate it, largely in order to
encourage the free passage of the automobile at the expense of all other urban values.” 483 In all,
the shortcomings of urban renewal were felt across the nation, but arguably most acutely in New
Haven because of the program’s intensity and magnitude.484
If anything, Lee had successfully brought together various different branches and
departments of government in the endorsement and execution of a comprehensive plan for the
city’s redevelopment, demonstrating his personal ingenuity, competence, and relentless drive as
a politician. Not restricted by limitations that had inhibited the actions of other mayors, he
proved to be extraordinarily productive, attempting to achieve what no other politician could
have even dreamt. Rae writes:
[Lee] was among the most brilliant, boldest, and most effective mayors at mid-century
anywhere in America. He dared to break the mold of ordinary mayoral politics, to create a
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powerful alternative to ordinary city government, and to reach for goals that would have been
(literally) inconceivable to [New Haven’s previous leaders]. No twentieth-century mayor of New
Haven – and few in America – came close to Lee in personal vision, in quality of appointed staff,
or in ability to articulate issues for just about any imaginable audience… and he achieved [some]
very tangible successes… Lee had addressed a project of social engineering that no government
on any scale has to my knowledge managed to fulfill.485
When elected, Lee was faced with a ‘dying’ city, burdened with countless problems,
including the proliferation of slums and blighted neighborhoods, the decay of housing quality,
the increase in residential poverty, the emergence and appeal of suburbia, the decline of
industrial/business production, and a dwindling economy. Inauspiciously, the beginning of his
administration coincided with the exact moment of the availability of entirely novel and readily
accessible federal assistance programs and funding – a perfect storm that enabled the Oak Street
neighborhood to be used as a laboratory for urban renewal. 486 Empowered and emboldened, he
felt obligated to “assiduously devote himself” to revive New Haven, vigorously expounding “the
idea that America’s older cities can and must renew themselves by a coordinated rebuilding
program designed to assure the economic future of the community as a whole.” 487
Through Lee, New Haven set the pace for redevelopment nationally, elevating him to a
‘celebrity status.’488 He “dared to dream of a new New Haven,” and was correct when he
characterized the Oak Street Project as “one of the most important things that [would] happen in
his lifetime” – unfortunately just not in the way he had envisioned, as its eventual (unintended)
outcomes were predominately negative. 489 His legacy, much of which rests with the city’s urban
renewal program, endures as a cataclysmic event for New Haven urbanism. 490 Lee’s trust in, and
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overriding enthusiasm for, redevelopment was not unwarranted – he was guided by those who
were thought to be some of the very best and brightest minds of the time in the field of urban
planning and was facing a city that was literally crumbling to the ground. By choosing to make
redevelopment the cornerstone of his career, he had put himself in the unfortunate position of
trying to defeat forces that were beyond his control – to save a city that was frankly unsavable.
Carley writes, “Lee’s belief that the bulldozer approach – fast, quantifiable results – was critical
to winning the backing of the New Haven business community arguably proved to be a negative
achievement.”491 For Rae, “Lee [had] placed himself in a different frame of reference… By
radically expanding the apparent agenda of local government, Lee had set himself up to be held
accountable… [and] set himself against history.” 492
Even with the full implementation of urban renewal on a comprehensive and utterly
destructive scale, Lee could not halt or reverse suburbanization, resurrect New Haven’s bygone
industrial manufacturing base, revitalize the city’s economy, or magically erect prosperity in the
place of leveled neighborhoods all in one fell swoop. Instead, redevelopment destroyed a lively
community and divided the fabric of the city, furthering New Haven’s decline into poverty and
hastening its residential suburban sprawl. As William Koh writes, “Despite his unparalleled
political power, Lee could not successfully resurrect the past while simultaneously erasing it
from memory.”493 The Oak Street Project and its poorly contrived, eponymous Connector had
apathetically and indiscriminately ripped through the city, mercilessly shredding everything in its
path, only in the end to be left disturbingly uncompleted. Simply put, urban renewal had become
urban removal.494 Rob Gurwitt writes, the project was “the alchemical transformation of a

491

Carley, Tomorrow is Here, 76.
Rae, City, 358-360.
493
Koh, Urban Renewal and the Oak Street Neighborhood, 3.
494
Holt and Celmer, Urban Renewal in the Model City.
492

102
declining neighborhood into an urban Sahara, the roughshod erection of highways through old
city centers, [and] the creation of poorly contrived downtown retail centers”495
In hindsight, Lee and the City of New Haven were simply too keen and too aggressive in
their pursuit of renewal, particularly comprehensive, large-scale redevelopment, rather than
merely encouraging or providing a path for it to occur organically. Although Lee’s intentions of
rescuing and redeeming his dying hometown were genuine, as he had unquestionably cared for
his city, he was no prognosticator, and was simply unable to appreciate that a plan of such
unprecedented scope could not realistically solve New Haven’s problems and would in fact
result in numerous detrimental, inadvertent consequences.496 His slumless ‘model city’ was, and
still is, mere fantasy, and the issues that plagued New Haven prior to urban renewal (poverty,
traffic, declining economy, etc.) continue to exist, surrounded by the scars, both physical and
emotional, of the city’s failed attempt at renewal. In total, the implementation of redevelopment,
specifically the Oak Street Project, exist as a profoundly life-altering episode in New Haven’s
history. Rae writes:
One whole neighborhood, doubtless meeting the common man’s definition of a slum, was
razed. The very core of the central business district, showing strong signs of decline by the
1950s, was bulldozed and replaced with large-scale commercial facilities better suited to a
suburban than to an urban setting. Other parts of the city were taken apart and put back
together… And yet, in attempting to restore the city to its former vitality, the Lee administration
would, in the main, fail.497
Reflecting on his shortcomings, Lee stated, “For everything we’ve done, there are five
things we haven’t done, or five things we’ve failed at. If New Haven is a model city, then God
help urban America.”498
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